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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that a retail worker making slightly above minimum wage is 
asked by her supervisor to come in early but not clock in until her shift is 
scheduled to begin. She is also asked to stay late, even though her babysitter 
is expecting her home, and to finish putting the clothes from the dressing 
rooms back on the racks before she leaves, but only after she clocks out. 
Imagine also that her manager tells her that yes, she can take her mandated 
lunch hour, but it would be better for her if she were to check and clean the 
bathrooms before she sat down to eat. Also, if she wants to keep her job, the 
forty-five hours she worked will be reflected on her time card as forty so 
that the store will not have to pay her premium overtime pay for those five 
extra hours, and thus keep within the company's strict payroll budget. She's 
told that the store will make it up to her next quarter, but it never does. Will 
she be able to find a private attorney to help her recover the dollars she has 
coming to her? Are her federal or state Departments of Labor likely to in-
vestigate her complaint, even if she was knowledgeable enough to make 
such a claim? 
Off-the-clock work, meal and overtime violations, and time shaving 
are all part of a pervasive wage theft problem facing American workers. 
Unscrupulous employers seek to survive and thrive in business by keeping 
payroll costs low through these and other unlawful wage practices. The law 
in this area is broad and clear: the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
requires that all workers (save the few covered by a small number of specif-
ic enumerated exceptions) must be paid minimum wage and overtime pay 
for all hours worked for the benefit of their employers. 1 Moreover, various 
state wage and hour laws provide further redress against off-the-clock work 
such as that described above. However, public enforcement of these legal 
mandates has been lacking for years, and private enforcement has come 
under recent attack by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Because of high transaction costs and relatively low potential damag-
es, the worker in the above example is likely to recover her lost wages only 
if she bands together with similarly-situated workers in an aggregate lawsuit 
against her employer. However, this type of collective action is under at-
tack: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion is the latest Supreme Court case to 
examine the viability of mandatory arbitration clauses that prohibit class 
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206, 207 (2006). 
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actions, and in a sharply divided opinion, it determined that mandating indi-
vidual arbitration is consistent with federal labor policy.2 
This Article brings new insights into the Supreme Court's widening 
blind spot regarding the impact procedural rules have on the substantive 
rights of low-wage workers. Moreover, it touches upon a greater trend in 
American jurisprudence of courts "closing the courtroom doors"3 on plain-
tiffs, especially those unlikely to afford legal representation. By drawing 
attention to the unjust effects of facially neutral rules on poor workers, this 
Article contributes to the national conversation on how Supreme Court 
precedent limiting judicial access affects the most vulnerable in our society. 
Much scholarly attention has been given to the debate on the appropri-
ateness of mandating arbitration, especially amongst employers and em-
ployees, with its attendant bargaining and power inequities.4 However, the 
literature thus far has failed to capture the rest of the story: it's not just 
about the forced nature of arbitration but also about whether the forum can 
fit the needs of vulnerable and poor parties. Moreover, the focus on em-
ployment arbitration is mostly centered on employment discrimination and 
the difficulties of arbitration as a forum for complex burden-shifting liabil-
ity. But wage claims are significantly different and bring a different set of 
considerations that must be addressed when evaluating the benefits and bur-
dens of the arbitration forum. 
At first blush, merely changing the forum from public litigation to pri-
vate arbitration would seem not to affect the ability of low-wage workers to 
vindicate their statutory wage rights. But, as this Article explains, several 
factors effectively incentivize unscrupulous employers to profit off the 
backs of low-wage workers: unfettered arbitration mandates, prohibitions- on 
aggregating claims, anemic regulation and public enforcement of wages, 
and high transactional costs. These factors combine to close the doors of 
justice on low-wage workers. 
In Part I, wage theft as a persistent national epidemic is discussed, in-
cluding the most recent studies on low-wage work and the trend in litigating 
statutory wage rights. Also, this section looks at the under-enforcement of 
2. 131 S. Ct. 1740(2011). 
3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENY. U. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2013). 
4. See, e.g., Bradley Dillon-Coffman, Comment, Revising the Revision: Procedural 
Alternatives to the Arbitration Fairness Act, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1096-97 (2010); Daniel 
B. Klaff, Debiasing and Bidirectional Bias: Cognitive Failure in Mandatory Employment 
Arbitration, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2010); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is 
Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Man-
datory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2002); Theodore J. St. Antoine, 
Mandatory Employment Arbitration: Keeping It Fair, Keeping It Lawful, 60 CASE W. REs. L. 
REV. 629 (2010). 
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our country's wage protections and employer incentives for violating the 
FLSA. 
In Part II, this Article examines the role class actions play in vindicat-
ing wage rights for low-wage workers. Because of the high transaction costs 
and relatively low individual damages at stake, aggregation of claims is 
often the only vehicle by which to vindicate statutory wage rights. Collec-
tive actions also have the advantage of protecting vulnerable workers from 
drawing attention to their individual participation and subjecting them to 
retaliatory measures. Additionally, collective actions increase awareness of 
workplace violations and increase the cost of non-compliance, which bene-
fits both workers and responsible employers who would otherwise be at a 
disadvantage in their competition with wage violators. 
Part III explores the doctrine of mandatory arbitration and class waiv-
ers, including the most recent trends in the arbitrability of federal wage and 
hour laws. Judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements has widened con-
siderably over the last several decades, culminating in a recent Supreme 
Court decision, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,5 which muddied the 
already unclear waters of class arbitration. This section looks carefully at 
the Concepcion decision and its progeny to help foresee the future of wage 
collective actions. 
Part IV summarizes the "search for the silver lining," asking where 
low-wage workers should go from here and proposing four plans for com-
bating wage theft. The first two paths involve redress for wage theft within 
the current enforcement and regulatory system with strategies addressing 
the current judicial climate. The second two proposals involve changing the 
arbitral forum to fit the need of low-wage workers, including a broader role 
for worker centers and unions, changing unauthorized practice of law rules, 
and developing specialized courts to address wage theft. 
I. WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA 
"Wage theft" has become the twenty-first century moniker for a varie-
ty of wage and hour violations faced by low-wage workers in today's work-
place.6 Unpaid minimum wages, misclassification of workers as "salaried" 
and therefore ineligible for overtime, "off-the-clock" work (such as pre- and 
post-shift unpaid work and work through mandatory unpaid breaks), illegal 
5. 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
6. See, e.g., KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING 
AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2d ed. 2011 ); Nan-
cy Reichman, What's in a Name? Wage Theft and the Criminalization of Unfair Labor Prac-
tices (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-
Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010); Nantiya Ruan, 
Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive 
Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REv. 727 (2010). 
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deductions, failure to pay final paychecks-these unlawful practices result 
in millions of dollars of lost money for workers who can least afford it.7 As 
witnessed by Dr. Nancy Reichman, a sociologist in the field, the number of 
scholarly articles and media reports studying the term "wage theft" first 
appeared in 2005 and has grown steadily since then.8 The rising number of 
lawsuits against major corporate employers is another indication that wage 
and hour violations portend a "crisis" for American workers.9 Claims by 
workers that their employers fail to pay them correctly have quadrupled 
over the last decade, increasing by 73% from 2006 to 2007 alone. 10 
For over seven decades, the federal standard for unpaid wage claims 
has been the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 11 Following hear-
ings in the 1930s, Congress found that the unregulated and substandard 
work conditions prevalent in Depression-era America negatively affected 
the "health, efficiency and general well-being" of workers, and enacted the 
FLSA. 12 The FLSA establishes: (1) a minimum wage; 13 (2) a requirement of 
premium overtime pay for work exceeding forty hours in a workweek; 14 (3) 
a prohibition on child labor; 15 and (4) a mandate that employers keep accu-
rate time records. 16 Notably, seventy-four years post-enactment, the FLSA 
remains the primary wage protection law of our country. 17 The fact that 
wage theft claims under the FLSA have seen such resurgence in the last 
decade suggests that protecting the well-being of low-wage workers remains 
a daunting challenge. 
A. Low-Wage Work: Impacting the Most Vulnerable 
One-quarter of all U.S. adults can be characterized as "low-wage 
workers," meaning they earn on average $27,000 per year while working at 
7. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: 
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA's CITIES 2-3 (2009). 
8. Reichman, supra note 6, at 4 ("The number of articles referencing 'wage theft' 
grew slowly after 2005 until 2009 when the number of articles referencing 'wage theft' ex-
ploded: eighty-three percent were written between 2009 and 2011."). 
9. Ruan, supra note 6, at 728. 
10. !d. 
II. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006). 
12. Carol Abdelmesseh & Deanne M. DiBlasi, Note, Why Punitive Damages Should 
Be Awarded for Retaliatory Discharge Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 21 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 715,719 (2004). 
13. 29 u.s.c. § 206 (2006). 
14. !d. § 207(a)(1). 
15. !d. § 212. 
16. !d. § 21I(c). 
17. States can go above the federal "floor" in providing higher minimum wages, 
protecting against "spread of hours" abuses, and allowing lengthier statutes of limitations. 
See, e.g., State Minimum Wages, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. I, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx. 
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least thirty hours per week. 18 Meanwhile, there is a growing gap between the 
top and bottom of the income ladder: in 2011, median household income for 
the bottom tenth of the income scale fell by 12% from a peak in 1999, while 
the top ninetieth percentile dropped by only 1.5%.19 The wage inequality of 
the working poor remains the largest threat Americans face in today's econ-
omy.20 Most scholarly attention and community advocacy for low-wage 
workers have focused on the most vulnerable within this category: the 
workplace abuses faced by immigrants.21 Those violations are severe and 
well-documented, including physical intimidation,22 harassment/3 and retal-
iation/4 as well as unpaid work. 
But wage theft affects low-wage workers across industries and com-
munities, not just within the immigrant population. Examples abound: the 
18. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., LOW-WAGE WORKERS AND HEALTH CARE I 
(2008), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7804.pdf. 
19. Sabrina Tavemise, Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2011, at AI; CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. 
SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 20 II, at 11 (20 12), available at http://www .census.gov/prod/20 12pubs/p60-
243.pdf. 
20. See generally Alan Hyde, Who Speaks for the Working Poor?: A Preliminary 
Look at the Emerging Tetralogy of Representation of Low-Wage Service Workers, 13 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 (2004). 
21. See, e.g., NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE'S 
GUIDE TO STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/20 11 /WinningWageJustice20 11.pdf?nocdn= I [hereinafter 
NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE] (noting how immigrant workers are 
particularly at risk for wage theft); NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES: LIMITING WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED 
WORKERS EXPOSES WORKERS TO GREATER RISKS OF INJURY, BUSINESS TO GREATER COSTS I 
(2011), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/f4626d080903865d3e_q7m6bn3qp.pdf [hereinafter 
NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES] (discussing the state of the law 
regarding the marginalization of immigrant workers); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an 
Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor 
Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 753-54 (2003) (discussing the barriers created by U.S. 
law preventing immigrant workers from unionizing or improving work conditions). See 
generally RUBEN J. GARCIA, MARGINAL WORKERS: HOW LEGAL FAULT LINES DIVIDE 
WORKERS AND LEAVE THEM WITHOUT PROTECTION (2012) (advocating for a new legal para-
digm to protect marginalized immigrant workers). 
22. Alvarado v. Shipley Donut Flour & Supply Co., 526 F. Supp. 2d 746, 767 (S.D. 
Tex. 2007) (describing employers who brandished weapons to workers and routinely assault-
ed workers); Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (alleging 
employer imprisoned Thai garment workers and assaulted them). 
23. Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1285 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (find-
ing employer kept workers imprisoned and routinely harassed them about their Indian herit-
age). 
24. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1059-60 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (finding the employer fired workers after they filed a FLSA claim); Contreras v. Co-
rinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d I 053, 1056-59 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding 
that FLSA applies to immigrant worker fired after he filed FLSA claim). 
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cashiers at retail chains that are misclassified as "assistant managers" and 
lose thousands in unpaid overtime;25 restaurant workers who have their tips 
"reallocated" to owners and management;26 truck drivers who have their 
hours shaved/7 car wash workers paid below minimum wage/8 temporary 
staffmg agency workers who lose premium overtime pay through creative 
time keeping. 29 
The sheer breadth of claims brought by low-wage workers across in-
dustries and employer size is remarkable. Wal-Mart (the world's largest 
private employer) paid $352 million dollars to settle sixty-three unpaid 
wages lawsuits in forty-two states, a settlement that still holds the record for 
the largest wage and hour settlement of all time.30 Bobby Flay, one of Amer-
25. Davis v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:10cv68 WHA, 2010 WL 3718834, at *7 
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2010) (denying summary judgment to employer who classified worker 
whose duties were comprised of 90% non-managerial tasks as an assistant manager in order 
to avoid paying overtime); see also Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 11 cv 0160 (JPO), 2012 
WL 260230, at *1 0 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012) (certifying class of misclassified, assistant store 
managers whose duties were primarily non-managerial and who sued for back wages); In re 
Staples Inc. Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., No. 08 5746 (KSH), 2011 WL 5413221 
(D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011) (approving $42 million settlement between misclassified assistant 
store managers and employer). 
26. DeMunecas v. Bold Food, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 00440(DAB), 2010 WL 3322580, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010); Driverv. Appleillinois, LLC, 265 F.R.D. 293,299 (N.D. Ill. 
2010) (certifying plaintiff's class and noting that the alleged employers "used money from 
the tip pool to make up for shortages in the cash register and to cover the bill of 'walk off 
customers"); Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (deducting 
tips taken from delivery drivers from wages because employer took money to compensate 
kitchen staff and, implicitly, management). 
27. In re Raymour & Flannigan Furniture, No. GE-851-0306-ZAY, 2008 WL 
2941771, at *1 (N.J. Admin. Apr. 21, 2008) (finding trucking company failed to pay over-
time wages in violation of state and federal law and ordering an internal audit to determine 
how much back pay the company owes), ajf'd, 964 A.2d 830 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009); see also Erik Ortiz, Raymour & Flanigan Drivers Get $2M for OT, 
PRESSOFATLANTICCITY.COM (July 8, 2009, 3:05 AM), 
http://www .pressofatlanticcity .com/business/article_ 39485 7 c2-233c-51 7 c-9dd2-
fcf148daac8c.html. 
28. Chao v. Atlantic Auto Care Ctr., Inc., No. 1:05-cv-06786-BSJ (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
15, 2009) (settling $3.6 million between workers and car wash employer after employer 
failed to pay wages and overtime); Libby Nelson, Car Wash Chain to Pay $3.4 Million in 
Back Wages, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2009, 4:38 PM), 
http:l/cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/car-wash-chain-will-pay-34-million-in-back-
wages. 
29. Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392, 395 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a traveler nurse, against 
defendant hospital and defendant temporary nurse agency where her employers failed to pay 
her overtime in sixteen different weeks that she worked over forty hours), ajf'd, 537 F.3d 
132, 153 (2d Cir. 2008). 
30. Steven Greenhouse & Stephanie Rosenbloom, Wal-Mart Settles 63 Lawsuits 
Over Wages, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/24/busi 
ness/24walmart.html. 
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ica's most celebrated chefs, owned (with others) three restaurants that stood 
accused of misappropriating the tips of servers and bartenders and failing to 
pay overtime.31 The FLSA collective action settled for $800,000 after sixty-
five servers opted in to the lawsuit.32 In Los Angeles, the city attorney filed 
criminal charges against owners of four car washes, charging them with 
failure to pay the minimum wage and failure to provide the workers lawful 
breaks.33 In the subsequent lawsuit, workers claimed they were paid a flat 
rate of $35 to $40 dollars a day for shifts that lasted more than eight hours, 
and were given only fifteen minutes a day for lunch, while some workers 
alleged they worked for tips alone.34 These cases highlight some examples 
of wage and hour abuses that see the light of a courthouse, and with suc-
cessful lawyering, compensate workers (though sometimes only partially) 
for lost wages. 
But an increasing number of studies have shown that many low-wage 
workers continue to be subject to wage theft and often lack legal access to 
have their claims heard. The most comprehensive study of wage theft was 
published in 2009.35 A collaboration of non-profits and research centers 
conducted a survey of 4,387 workers in low-wage industries in the three 
largest U.S. cities: Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.36 These "front-
line" workers37 were employed by both large and small employers in a vari-
ety of industries, such as retail stores, residential construction, and home 
health care. 38 The survey asked specific questions about their work and 
compensation in the previous work week.39 Twenty-six percent of surveyed 
workers reported being paid less than minimum wage, with more than half 
underpaid by more than a dollar an hour.4° For the low-wage workers that 
worked over forty hours in a week, 76% faced unpaid or underpaid over-
time.41 These (and other) violations resulted in a wage theft of 15% of earn-
ings for the surveyed workers, and, if extrapolated to the nearly 1.12 million 
low-wage workers in the three cities, would result in low-wage workers 
losing more than $56 million dollars per week.42 
31. DeMunecas, 2010 WL 3322580, at *1,*3. 
32. !d. at * 1. 
33. Evelyn Larrubia, Criminal Charges Filed Against Car Wash Owners, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2009, 5:08PM), http://latimesb1ogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/02/los-angeles-
cit.html. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
!d.; BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 1. 
See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 7. 
!d. at iii. 
!d. at 2 (meaning exclusion of managers, professional, or technical workers). 
!d. at 9. 
!d. 
!d. at 2, 20. 
!d. 
42. !d. at 5-6. 
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Smaller, more localized studies support the conclusion that low-wage 
workers suffer wage theft at an alarming rate. In New York City, 30% of 
436 retail workers interviewed reported that they worked over forty hours 
without being paid overtime, while 73% were not paid the four-hour mini-
mum reporting pay when called in to work, as required by state law. 43 In 
San Francisco, a survey of Chinatown workers reported that 50% of work-
ers earned less than minimum wage, with 13% earning $5.00 an hour or 
less.44 In Denver, Colorado, 40% of domestic workers surveyed earned less 
than minimum wage; 45% reported they were not paid for all hours worked; 
and 90% stated they worked sixty hours or more in a week yet failed to re-
ceive overtime pay.45 
Reported litigation, combined with recent surveys, shows that wage 
theft is not uncommon or relegated to a few vulnerable industries by a hand-
ful of "rogue" employers. 46 Instead, its widespread effects harm not only the 
poorest of our society, but also disadvantage responsible employers who are 
forced to compete with unscrupulous competitors in a tight labor market and 
s.lQ..w economy. Some commentators blame the incentives to violate the 
FLSA for deepening the wage theft problem.47 When employers balance 
"'the expected costs of the mandated wage ... against the expected cost of 
non-compliance, "'48 given that the FLSA only allows for liquidated (double) 
damages with no punitive damage allowance, the calculus informs employ-
ers to keep their money in the bank and wait for enforcement, either private 
or public. Usually the wait is quite lengthy, if it comes at all, as the next 
section details. 
B. Under-Enforcement by Regulatory Agencies and the Barriers to Private 
Enforcement 
To vindicate their wage and hour statutory rights to recover lost wages 
owed to them, workers have few choices: file a complaint with the federal 
43. STEPHANIE LUCE & NAOKI FUJITA, DISCOUNTED JOBS: HOW RETAILERS SELL 
WORKERS SHORT 2, 8 (2012), available at http://retailactionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/20 12/0 1/Disconted-J obs-Fina!A.pdf. 
44. CHINESE PROGRESSIVE ASS'N, CHECK, PLEASE! HEALTH AND WORKING 
CONDITIONS IN SAN FRANCISCO CHINATOWN RESTAURANTS 4-5 (20 I 0). 
45. Tony Robinson, Jessie Dryden & Heather Gomez-Duplantis, On the Job with 
Domestic Workers: Workplace Abuse and Worker Exploitation in Colorado's Invisible 
Workforce 15 (2010), available at http://www.centrohumanitario.org/Domestic%20Worker 
%20El%20Centro _Published. pdf. 
46. NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 6. 
47. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 19-21. 
48. !d. at 19 (quoting David Wei!, Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluat-
ing a New Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 238, 
239 (2005)). 
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or state labor regulatory agency or bring a private cause of action under the 
FLSA or state wage and hour laws, or both.49 
Federal government statistics reflect a decline in the number of work-
ers served by the regulatory agency charged with enforcing our nation's 
wage and hours rights. An aggrieved employee can file a complaint to the 
Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). 
In 2008, the WHD received 23,845 complaints; such complaints have de-
creased in number each year since 2002.50 The WHD decides whether to 
conduct an investigation based on the information in the worker's com-
plaint.51 If, during an investigation, the WHD determines that the employer 
violated the FLSA, it may seek FLSA enforcement by filing a civil suit.52 
Advocates and many scholars agree that wage and hour enforcement has 
been hampered by a lack of resources and "political will to investigate low-
wage workers' claims."53 
The most recent DOL statistics show that in 2008, the WHD conclud-
ed 28,242 cases and recovered roughly $185 million dollars in backpay for 
228,645 employees. 54 This is the fewest number of resolved cases and few-
est number of employees receiving recovery for lost wages since 2002.55 
During this time period, one study found that the WHD suffered significant 
declines in staffing, with only 732 investigatory agents, the lowest number 
49. See U.S. DEPT. LABOR, FairPay---Filing a Complaint for Back Wages Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/fairpay/com 
plaint.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); see, e.g., David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of 
Wage and Hour Collective Actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL'Y J. 129, 130 (2003) (describing "the development ofthe collective action as a means of 
private Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement and the issues that have arisen in implement-
ing these procedures"). 
50. Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage and Hour Collects over $1.4 
Billion in Back Wages for over 2 Million Employees Since Fiscal Year 2001, at I (2008), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/2008Fisca1Year.pdf. 
51. See 2 LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE AND HOUR LAW: COMPLIANCE 
& PRACTICE§ 19:2 (2004) (summarizing the criteria used by the Wage and Hour Division to 
select employers for investigation). 
52. E.g., id. § 19:10 (outlining the WHD's options when it has found violations of 
the Act, which include taking no action, settling the matter with the employer, notifying the 
employees of their private right of action, referring the file for litigation, or closing the file 
after unsuccessful attempts at settlement). 
53. Rita J. Verga, An Advocate's Toolkit: Using Criminal "Theft of Service" Laws 
to Enforce Workers' Right to Be Paid, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 283, 286 (2005) (citing JENNIFER 
GORDON, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE UNPAID WAGES 
PROHIBITION ACT: LATINO IMMIGRANTS CHANGE NEW YORK WAGE LAW 3-4 (1999), availa-
ble at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/imp_wp4gordon.pdf); NAT'L EMP'T LAW 
PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 6. 
54. WAGE & HOUR DIY., supra note 50, at 1. 
55. See id. 
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in thirty years. 56 While at first blush, a decline in complaints to the DOL 
might be interpreted to mean a decreasing wage theft problem, this interpre-
tation is at odds with recent studies of wage theft amongst the working poor 
and the concurrent increase in FLSA litigation filings. Instead, it reflects a 
deliberate choice of employees to vindicate wage rights through litigation 
and not government enforcement, a decision supported by the lack of en-
forcement resources. 
The picture is grim for low-wage workers who wish to make a com-
plaint to the DOL. In a report released in March 2009, the Government Ac-
countability Office found that the WHD mishandled nine of the ten cases 
brought by a team of undercover agents posing as aggrieved workers. 57 The 
report gives a stark example: a U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) undercover agent posing as a dishwasher called four times to com-
plain about not being paid overtime for nineteen weeks; the DOL's Miami 
office failed to return his calls for four months, and when it did, an official 
told him it would take eight to ten months to begin investigating his case. 58 
Additionally, the DOL diminishes the deterrent effect it might have on 
dishonest employers when it publicizes the fact that it rarely seeks the full 
extent of damages afforded by the law and largely pursues individual mone-
tary awards instead of seeking collective awards or industry-wide injunctive 
relief. 59 The investigators at the WHD are instructed not to include the liqui-
dated damages amount in their negotiations with employers and to seek just 
two years of backpay, instead of the statutorily-allowed three, for willful 
violations. 60 
Since 2008, although DOL statistics are not yet available, one might 
predict that under the Obama Administration, the DOL's resources and pol-
icy agenda would increase enforcement. And some evidence supports that 
assumption: Obama promptly authorized 250 additional investigation 
56. Irene Lurie, Enforcement of State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: Re-
sources, Procedures, and Outcomes, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 411, 412 (2011) (citing 
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-08-962T, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: BETTER 
USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND CONSISTENT REPORTING COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE 6 
(2008)) ("Only 732 investigators were on board in 2007 to enforce compliance with mini-
mum wage and overtime laws across the country, fewer investigators than thirty years earli-
er."). 
57. See U.S. Gov'T AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-09-458T, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR: WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION'S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES 
LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122107.pdf; Steven Greenhouse, Labor Agency Is Failing 
Workers, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A16. 
58. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 57, at 6. 
59. See NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, JUST PAY: IMPROVING WAGE AND HOUR 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 9-10 (2010), available at 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/20 1 O/JustPayReport20 1 O.pdf?nocdn= 1. 
60. See id. at 10. 
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hires,61 the DOL implemented a new "regulatory philosophy" of requiring 
employers to audit themselves to ensure they are complying with the law/2 
and the 2011 budget included $25 million for the DOL to address the mis-
classification of employees, $12 million of which was designated for en-
forcement of wage and overtime laws.63 Whether these measures can reverse 
a three-decade long decline in DOL enforcement remains to be seen. 
Additionally, state wage and hour agencies are tasked with the en-
forcement of state wage and hour laws. States' efforts to enforce wage and 
hours laws vary greatly.64 One recent study found that "[t]he resources that 
states devoted to enforcing their laws, the procedures they used, and the 
volume of their enforcement activity were strikingly different" and the 
"volume of enforcement activity ranged from 303 cases per thousand low-
wage workers to four cases, and the wages collected per case ranged from 
$36,294 to $128."65 Local studies of state agency enforcement support the 
conclusion that under-enforcement of state wage and hour laws remains 
common. Just over a decade ago, the New York State Department of Labor 
was challenged as systemically under-enforcing its wage and hour laws, as 
well as being unresponsive to immigrant workers' complaints.66 A 2002 
study of California's Division of Labor Standards Enforcement found that 
its budget and staffing allocations have not kept up with growth of the 
state's workforce, and its investigations and penalties assessed have not 
increased in proportion to additional funding and staffing.67 
The other avenue for workers to vindicate their statutory wage rights 
is to bring a private action in civil court without reporting the violation to 
the DOL.68 Of course, when an employee brings a civil claim to federal or 
state court, she is responsible for the costs of litigation, and in some juris-
61. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Statement by Hilda L. Solis, U.S. Sec'y of 
Labor, on Wage and Hour Division's Increased Enforcement and Outreach Efforts (Nov. 19, 
2009), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/whd20091452.htm. 
62. Regulatory Agenda Narrative, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. (2010), 
http://www .dol.gov/regulations/20 I ORegNarrative.htm. 
63. Press Release, supra note 61; Seth D. Harris, DOL Deputy Secretary Seth D. 
Harris, U.S. DEPT. LABOR (JUNE 17, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/ _sec/media/congress/ 
20 I 00617 Harris.htm. 
64. Lurie, supra note 56, at 433. 
65. /d. 
66. GORDON, supra note 53, at 4-5. 
67. Limor Bar-Cohen & Deana Milam Carrillo, Labor Law Enforcement in Califor-
nia, 1970-2000, in STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABOR 135 (2002). 
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). Unlike Title VII of the Civil Right Act, where a 
plaintiff must first bring a charge of discrimination to the regulatory agency of the EEOC, a 
wage claim can be brought directly to court without first complaining to the regulatory agen-
cy. 
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dictions, liable for attorneys' fees if she is not successful in the lawsuit.69 
For low-wage workers this is a significant barrier to accessing the law. 70 
While free legal service organizations take some wage and hour cases, giv-
en how few there are and their small budgets/1 it remains a small drop in 
the bucket for addressing wage theft. Moreover, federally funded Legal 
Services Corporation offices are prohibited from representing undocument-
ed workers, a significant number of the low-wage workers in America. 72 
Given the financial barriers to bringing individual private causes of ac-
tion, aggregating low-wage workers' claims has been the primary source of 
private enforcement of wage theft. 
II. THE ROLE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN PROTECTING AGAINST WAGE THEFT 
For low-wage workers who are unable to attain attorney representation 
for their individual wage theft claims, aggregating claims with other work-
ers is often the only way to have their claims addressed. By combining their 
relatively small damage award with multiple similarly-situated workers, 
class action attorneys have an incentive to become "private attorney[s] gen-
eral" in FLSA practice.73 As outlined below, there are advantages to low-
69. See, e.g., id. § 216 (shifting fees to winning employees); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 8-
4-110 (2012) (shifting fees to the prevailing party in a wage dispute, either employer or 
employee); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-10-80 (2012) (shifting fees only to the employee in the 
event employee wins); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4111.10 (LexisNexis 2007) (shifting fees to 
employee if the employee wins); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-59 (2012) (shifting fees to win-
ning employers who defend against unreasonable claims). 
70. See, e.g., Faisal Bhabha, Institutionalizing Access-to-Justice: Judicial, Legisla-
tive and Grassroots Dimensions, 33 QUEEN'S L.J. 139, 141 (2007) ("[Access-to-justice initia-
tives] seek[] principally to address barriers to legal remedies created by the prohibitively 
high costs oflitigation."); Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social 
Capability, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 118 (20 I 0) (citing the importance of access to justice 
initiatives as a means to combat cost barriers for low-income litigants); J. Maria Glover, The 
Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1137, 1184-85 (2012) (discussing the importance of fee-shifting provisions for low-income 
litigants in wage claims); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1785, 
1804 (2001) (outlining the cost barriers that prevent low-income litigants from achieving 
justice). 
71. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Pub-
lic-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211-12 (2003) (noting the limited budgets of 
public assistance programs and the inability to take every case). 
72. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, § 504(a)(l8), 110 Stat. 1321-56 (1996). LSCs are also prohibited from litigating 
class actions, an important vehicle for vindicating wage theft, as seen in Part II of this Arti-
cle. 
73. James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-in Class Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and ADEA: 
What Does It Mean to Be "Similarly Situated"?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 95, 99, 102-03 
(2004); see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam); Holt 
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wage workers in using this procedural device, and strong evidence suggests 
that individual wage and hour cases are becoming increasingly rare, while 
class and collective actions are growing. 74 
For minimum or overtime wage claims under the FLSA,75 statutory 
language in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) trumps Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23/6 
meaning that wage "collective actions"77 are a different creature than Rule 
23 class actions. Rule 23 covers most types of cases, including consumer 
fraud, mass torts, antitrust, and civil rights. It operates as an opt-out device: 
if the class meets the rule's requirements, 78 putative class members must 
"opt-out" in order to be removed from the reach of the case.79 
v. Rite Aid Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (citing Hoffmann-La Roche 
Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)). 
74. BOBO, supra note 6, at 17, 19; see, e.g., Phelps v. 3PD, Inc., 261 F.R.D. 548, 563 
(D. Or. 2009) (recognizing superiority of class actions in employment cases due to typically 
small size of individual awards); Chase v. AIMCO Props., L.P., 374 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 
(D.D.C. 2005) ("[I]ndividual wage and hour claims might be too small in dollar terms to 
support a litigation effort."); Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 P.3d 194, 209 
(Cal. 2004) ('"[T]he class suit ... provides small [overtime] claimants with a method of 
obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litiga-
tion."' (quoting Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 27 (Cal. 1981))); Noah A. 
Finkel, State Wage-and-Hour Law Class Actions: The Real Wave of "FLSA" Litigation?, 7 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 159, 162 n.9 (2003) (noting the success of class-actions in recent 
years, with settlements as high as $90 million). See generally Glover, supra note 70, at 1184-
87 (highlighting the advantages of class actions in wage and hour claims); Catherine K. 
Ruckelshaus, Labor's Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 385-86 (2008) (discussing 
factors that limit workers' access to the court system, including the small size of individual 
claims). 
75. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
76. Early arguments that Rule 23 should apply to FLSA claims failed. See, e.g., 
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The clear weight of au-
thority holds that Rule 23 procedures are inappropriate for the prosecution of class actions 
under§ 216(b)."); Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532, 536 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(noting that "Rule 23 cannot be invoked to circumvent [§ 216(b)] consent" and "[courts] 
have uniformly ruled that ... Rule 23[ is] not applicable to ... § [2]16(b)"); LaChapelle v. 
Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding "fundamental, irreconcila-
ble difference between" Rule 23 and§ 216(b), and because§ 216(b) "is unambiguous," and 
"we must apply the law as it has been written"). 
77. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 
201). 
78. Rule 23(a) requires that: 
(I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
FED. R. Clv. P. 23(a). Additionally, a class also must qualify as one of the three Rule 23(b) 
types defined mainly by the relief sought. The least common, (b)(1), applies when separate 
actions risk multiple court orders inconsistent with each other or the rights of non-parties; 
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In contrast, aggregate FLSA claims are governed by statutory rule: 
Section 216(b).80 Pursuant to statute, these are "opt-in" actions, requiring 
each putative plaintiff to opt in to the suit by filing a consent-to-join form 
with the court in order to participate in the action.81 A brief historical over-
view is helpful to understand its importance and how this distinction 
evolved. 
Enacted as part of the FLSA, and applicable to later employment laws 
codified in the same statutory chapter, Section 216(b) provides that "[a]n 
action ... may be maintained ... by any one or more employees for ... 
other employees similarly situated."82 Under the original statutory language, 
"collective action[ s ]" let employees designate third parties, mainly labor 
unions, to file their wage suits, but soon this practice drew heavy criticism. 83 
To eliminate third-party suits, in 194 7 Congress amended Section 216(b) to 
require workers themselves be the plaintiffs84 and that other workers must 
affirmatively "opt in" by filing a written consent,85 which reflected the pre-
vailing class mechanism of the time. 86 This amendment carne before modem 
Rule 23 opt-out classes were implemented to assist civil rights causes of 
action in the 1960s, and soon thereafter became the norm. 87 The sole re-
Section (b)(2) applies when members seek mainly injunctive or declaratory relief against a 
party who acted on "grounds that apply generally to the class," as in lawsuits against segre-
gation or pollution, while (b)(3) applies to money damages claims, making it most similar to 
§ 216(b) wage collective actions. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b). A (b)(3) class requires that common 
issues "predominate" over individual ones and that a class action be "superior to other" op-
tions, such as many individual suits. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Scott A. Moss & 
Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage Rights by Misap-
plying Class Action Rules, 6! AM. U. L. REV. 523, 530-32 (2012). 
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
80. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207, 216(b) (2006). 
81. See id. § 216(b). 
82. /d. 
83. 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Donnell) ("[C]ases in which an 
outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of stirring up litigation without being an employ-
ee at all, ... may result in very decidedly unwholesome champertous situations."); Moss & 
Ruan, supra note 78, at 533 (citing Arrington v. Nat'! Broad. Co., 531 F. Supp. 498, 501 
(D.D.C. 1982)). 
84. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); see also Ruan, supra note 6, at 731-32 (refer-
ring to such claims as "blackmail" suits (citing Fraser, supra note 73, at 98)). 
85. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) ("In enact-
ing the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, .... the requirement that an employee file a written 
consent was added [to § 216(b )]."). 
86. On June 25, 1938, when the FLSA was enacted, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were pending before Congress and not yet effective, and modem Rule 23 class ac-
tions would not exist until 1966. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966 amend.). 
87. See Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive 
Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL'Y J. 395,400-01 (2006). 
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quirement of Section 216(b) is that members must be "similarly situated" 
and opt into the action individually. 
The procedural oddity that is Section 216(b ), combined with the value 
of most individual wage theft claims, sets the stage for an increased role that 
aggregate litigation plays for low-wage workers.88 
A. The Difficulties in Prosecuting Small Wage Claims 
The courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, routinely recognize the 
importance of aggregate litigation because it often remains the only means 
of judicial relief where a plaintiffs claim is too small economically to sup-
port individual litigation.89 Where the value of the claim is less than the 
transaction costs, such "negative-value" claims typically are heard only if 
brought in the aggregate.90 Most claims of low-wage workers involve rela-
tively small per-person damages,91 and although these lost wages are crucial 
88. Much of the research and ideas expressed in these next subsections were articu-
lated by the author in a previously co-authored piece written for the amicus brief on behalf of 
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law et al., in support of the respondents 
in the AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion case before the Supreme Court in 2010. See Brief 
for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 2010 WL 3935515 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2010) 
(No. 09-893). 
89. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that the 
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism '"is to overcome the problem that small 
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting 
his or her rights'" (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 
1997))); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class actions ... per-
mit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually."); 
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (I 980) ("Where it is 
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity 
of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective re-
dress unless they may employ the class-action device."). 
90. Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL 
2671813, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) ("In this case, the plaintiff would be foreclosed from 
bringing her pattern or practice claim ... by the practicality of economic pressures limiting 
the value of her claim compared with the cost of prosecuting it .... "); Mascol v. E & L 
Transp., Inc., No. CV-03-3343 CPS, 2005 WL 1541045, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005) 
(holding "the class action form is superior to alternative methods of adjudicating this contro-
versy" because the claims were negative value); Iliadis v. Wai-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 A.2d 
710, 725 (N.J. 2007) ("Because of the very real likelihood that class members will not bring 
individual actions, class actions are 'often the superior form of adjudication when the claims 
of the individual class members are small."' (quoting Weber v. Goodman, 9 F. Supp. 2d 163, 
170-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1998))). 
91. See Phelps v. 3PD, Inc., 261 F.R.D. 548, 563 (D. Or. 2009) (recognizing the 
superiority of class actions due to the typically small size of individual awards); Chase v. 
AIMCO Props., L.P., 374 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[I]ndividual wage and hour 
claims might be too small in dollar terms to support a litigation effort."); Sa v-on Drug Stores, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 P.3d 194, 209 (Cal. 2004) (observing, in an overtime action, that 
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to the workers themselves, they fail to capture the attention of a plaintiff's 
attorney who, although entitled to statutory fees under the FLSA,92 can only 
justify the resources it takes to successfully prosecute wage claims if they 
involve multiple plaintiffs.93 
Additionally, individual litigation requires one plaintiff to shoulder the 
demands of the lawsuit, including spending many hours assisting in the in-
vestigation of the claims and bearing the costs (both financial and personal) 
of the litigation. Most low-wage workers working on an hourly basis simply 
cannot afford the time and expense it would take to prosecute the claims 
individually, nor can they proceed on their own, even if they could navigate 
the DOL regulatory complaint process or litigate the claims successfully in 
court pro se. When proceeding as a collective action, the extent to which 
any one worker bears the burden of prosecuting the litigation is limited. 
B. The Threat ofRetaliation 
Across industries and where unemployment rates are high, the threat 
of reprisal for bringing a legal claim against one's employer prevents many 
workers from pursuing litigation.94 Current employees fear termination, 
retaliation in the form of change in schedule or job duties, harassment, or 
'"the class suit ... provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims 
which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation'" (quoting Richmond v. 
Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 27 (Cal. 1981))); Ruckelshaus, supra note 74, at 386 (discuss-
ing factors, including the typically small size of each individual worker's claim, that contrib-
ute to workers' lack of access to the courts); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 57, at 9 ("Low wage workers may be unable to afford attorney's fees or may be unwill-
ing to argue their own case in small claims court, leaving them with no other options to ob-
tain their back wages."). 
92. 29 u.s.c. § 216 (2006). 
93. See Scott v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 268 (D. Conn. 2002) (conclud-
ing that a class action is the superior method for bringing plaintiffs' overtime claims, in part, 
because "the cost of individual litigation is prohibitive"); Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating 
Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that individual suits, as an alternative 
to class litigation, may not be feasible based on class members' lack of financial resources 
and disincentives for attorneys). 
94. See Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage 
Law Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 296-97 (2008) 
("Workers do not pursue rights claims in a vacuum; there are risks to participating in rights 
enforcement because one must decide whether to challenge employer practices from within 
the employment relationship."); David Wei! & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, 
Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the US. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & 
PoL'Y J. 59, 83 (2005) (referring to studies suggesting that "despite explicit retaliation pro-
tections under various labor laws, being fired is widely perceived to be a consequence of 
exercising certain workplace rights"); Steven G. Zieff, Advanced Issues in Collective Ac-
tions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 435, 437 (2006). 
.- ...... 
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reduction in pay.95 As the authors of the most comprehensive wage theft 
study found, 43% of the low-wage workers surveyed who complained about 
violations of workplace standards were retaliated against, including being 
fired, suspended, or threatened with reductions in hours or pay.96 For former 
workers who fear difficulties in finding new employment opportunities, 
being part of a federal litigation is too threatening to contemplate. Workers 
fear industry "blacklisting" and lack of positive job references, a necessary 
ingredient for successful job hunts.97 
The Supreme Court has recognized the imbalance of power that en-
genders such fear in workers. As Justice Marshall acknowledged in a Su-
preme Court decision of 1978, employers, "by virtue of the employment 
relationship, may exercise intense leverage. Not only can the employer fire 
the employee, but job assignments can be switched, hours can be adjusted, 
wage and salary increases held up, and other more subtle forms of influence 
exerted."98 
For low-wage workers, these concerns are especially poignant given 
their precarious job security. Low-wage workers are particularly vulnerable 
to retaliation because many live "paycheck to paycheck" in mostly low-
skilled jobs, where employers consider them replaceable and therefore ex-
pendable.99 Low-wage workers are therefore loath to challenge unlawful 
wage practices, especially when unemployment rates are high. For immi-
grant workers with limited English proficiency and little familiarity with 
their legal rights, challenging wage theft is nearly impossible. 100 
95. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 289-90 
(1960) (noting that plaintiffs were fired after they filed FLSA claims based on employer's 
"displeasure" over their actions); Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872, 874 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (noting that employees were discharged after refusing to take a "loyalty oath" 
repudiating their rights to unpaid wages); Steven Greenhouse, Forced to Work Off the Clock, 
Some Fight Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at AI (quoting a former manager stating that 
workers who complained of wage and hour violations were '"weeded out and terminated"'). 
96. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 3. 
97. See, e.g., Mori-Noriega v. Antonio's Rest., Inc., 923 F.2d 839, 839 (I st Cir. 
1990) (unpublished table decision) (noting that plaintiffs current employer fired him be-
cause he had cooperated with the Department of Labor in its investigation of his former 
employer's violation of wage and hour laws). 
98. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,240 (1978). 
99. See BOBO, supra note 6, at 7-15; BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 9 ("Alt-
hough women, immigrants, and people of color are disproportionately affected by workplace 
violations, we found that where a worker is employed-that is, in which industry and in what 
type of job--is generally a much better predictor of violations than the worker's demograph-
ic characteristics."). 
100. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 5 (citing increased proficiency in Eng-
lish as one way to combat wage theft); id. at 42 (noting the increased likelihood of a wage 
violation for workers with limited English proficiency). See generally GARCIA, supra note 
21. 
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However, collective actions under the FLSA protect workers from re-
taliation to a lesser extent than Rule 23 class actions. Rule 23(d) provides a 
mechanism for judges to enter orders protecting the class, such as authoriz-
ing certain discovery and banning harassing litigation tactics. 10 ' Additional-
ly, class actions under Rule 23 help alleviate plaintiffs' fear of retaliation 
because they allow all but a few named plaintiffs to pursue their rights 
without having to opt in to the suit. They are "nameless" and "faceless" in 
the litigation until liability is found and damages are assessed. 102 In contrast, 
for FLSA collective actions, each worker must affirmatively opt in to the 
suit, which puts their name before both the court and the employer's attor-
neys in the early stages of the litigation. 103 Although no study yet has deter-
mined that FLSA plaintiffs face a greater rate of retaliation than Rule 23 
plaintiffs, the perception of workers is that they are more exposed by af-
firmatively opting in, and that perception works to dissuade workers from 
participating. 
C. The Importance ofNotification Under 216(b) 
Today, many workers, especially low-wage workers, are unaware that 
their statutory wage rights have been violated until they are specifically 
informed of the violation. Unlike the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, 
where the societal ideal of anti-discrimination was discussed openly and 
publicly, wage protection laws enjoyed their heyday (if at all) close to 
eighty years ago, when the New Deal legislation addressed the abysmal 
conditions of the working poor. 104 Some employers misinform (either inten-
tionally or unintentionally) their employees that the law does not protect 
them or that they are exempt from minimum wage or overtime laws. 105 For 
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d); see also Guifu Li v. A Perfect Day Franchise, Inc., 270 
F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
102. Moss & Ruan, supra note 78, at 533-34 (discussing the relative advantages of 
being an unnamed plaintiff in a class action). 
103. 29 U.S.C. 216(b); see also Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 
173 (1989) (noting that the 194 7 Portal-to-Portal Act added a "requirement that an employee 
file a written consent"). 
I 04. Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to combat "the 
existence ... of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." 29 U.S.C. § 
202(a) (2006). 
105. Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(indicating that defendants misrepresented to employees that they were exempt and not enti-
tled to overtime pay); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 
1984) (noting that plaintiffs alleged affirmative misrepresentations by employer which were 
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations applicable to their claims); Gentry v. Superior 
Court, 165 P.3d 556, 567 ("The likelihood of employee unawareness is even greater when, as 
alleged in the present ease, the employer does not simply fail to pay overtime but affirma-
tively tells its employees that they are not eligible for overtime."). 
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immigrants, Hoffman Plastics Compounds (which limited backpay remedies 
to undocumented workers in a NLRA suit) likely has contributed to the con-
fusion on whether they can prosecute their wage rights in a court of law. 106 
Courts have reasoned that notice to affected workers who must affirm-
atively opt in to the suit before the statute of limitations runs out107 is a nec-
essary component of collective action procedure. 108 Early in the litigation, 
notice of collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) provides workers not 
only information regarding their wage rights, but an entry point into the 
legal system by directing them to the plaintiffs' attorneys for counsel. By 
letting workers know of an ongoing litigation, they can gain some measure 
of security and comfort knowing that they are not alone in challenging the 
policies and practices of their employers. 
D. Deterring Future Wage Theft 
Through aggregating claims, workers benefit from the increased pres-
sure employers feel when faced with collective litigation and the opportuni-
ties for making positive, systemic changes in the workplace through class-
wide discovery and injunctive relief. 
Collective actions provide a strong counterbalance to employers' in-
centive to violate the FLSA. The sheer magnitude and scope of class litiga-
tion enhances the likelihood that a targeted employer will comply with the 
law. In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys note that upon service of a class complaint, 
workers report that the employer changes its wage practices to come into 
compliance with the law. 109 The ability of collective claims to obtain signifi-
cant damages in back pay and potential attorneys' fees (even absent punitive 
damages) changes the calculus for employers contemplating compliance or 
noncompliance. 
106. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the 
Fifth Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27, 28 (2008); Ruben J. Garcia, Ten Years After 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: The Power of a Labor Law Symbol, 21 
CORNELL J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 659, 669 (2012) (noting that while "[t]he true impact of Hoffman 
may be hard to determine," nevertheless "courts have generally not extended Hoffman past 
the issue of back pay under the [National Labor Relations Act], but the breadth of the Court's 
holding can be applied to remedies other than back pay"). 
107. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006); see also Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80 
(3d Cir. 1986) (finding a willful violation after company vice president and general manger 
admitted to knowing the FLSA applied to overtime pay). 
108. See, e.g., Sipas v. Sammy's Fishbox, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 10319(PAC), 2006 WL 
1084556, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006). 
109. Interview with Adam T. Klein, Partner, Outten & Golden LLP, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
(Oct. 26, 2011) (on file with author). 
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Moreover, collective actions under the FLSA brought by the DOL can 
include injunctive relief as a remedy. 110 Injunctive relief-mandating chang-
es in corporate policies and practices--can have a tremendous impact on 
low-wage workers, especially when involving large employers.'" While 
some scholars have criticized employment discrimination class actions as 
having little to no effect on actual positive change in the workplace because 
of the lack of meaningful injunctive relief, 112 such criticism has not yet tar-
geted FLSA collective actions, perhaps because DOL actions are relatively 
rare, or perhaps because wage violations (denying overtime, classifying too 
many as "exempt," etc.) are easier to stop than more decentralized, more 
subjective hiring decisions that may be based on subconscious or at least 
hidden discriminatory intent. 
Lastly, when alleging wage and hour violations, the same corporate 
policies, patterns, and practices usually affect multiple workers in a work-
place, not just individuals. When litigating an individual suit, it can be diffi-
cult to identify and prove systemic violations, in part because company-
wide discovery is not allowed or affordable. 113 In contrast, collective actions 
demand that plaintiffs prove that employees are "similarly situated," which 
opens the door to the discovery of class-wide statistics and evidence. 
However, while these pressures legitimately promote compliance with 
wage laws by unscrupulous employers, the same procedures are said to ap-
110. See, e.g., Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (11th Cir. 1998); Vega Castro v. 
Puerto Rico, 43 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (D.P.R. 1999), ajf'd sub nom. Jusino Mercado v. Puerto 
Rico, 214 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2000); EEOC v. AT&T Co., 365 F. Supp. 1105, 1121 (E.D. Pa. 
1973), ajf'd, 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974). 
Ill. See, e.g., Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., Nos. C-94-4335 SI, C-95-2182 SI, 1997 
WL 605754 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29 1997) (doubling the representation of women in manage-
ment-track positions at Home Depot, one of the nation's largest retail chains); Freeman v. 
City of Philadelphia, 751 F. Supp. 509, 513-14, 522 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (increasing the number 
of African-American police officers in Philadelphia's police force from 12% to 35%); Pub. 
Interest Law Ctr. of Phila., Law Center Joins Forces with Other Civil Rights Organizations 
to Protect Ability to Combat Discrimination with Class Action Lawsuits (Oct. 31, 2007) 
(noting the increase in the number of African-Americans in Philadelphia's police force as a 
result of the consent decree); Home Depot, Female Employees Report Progress, 
HR.BLR.CoM (June 24, 2002), http://hr.blr.com/HR-news/Discrimination/Sex-
Discrimination!Home-Depot-Female-Employees-Report-Progress (reporting the increase in 
the number of women in management-trackjobs at Home Depot). 
112. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class 
Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 
(2003). 
113. See REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS & DIRK OLIN, REBUILDING JUSTICE: CiVIL COURTS 
IN JEOPARDY AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE (2011) (noting the high cost of discovery in civil 
litigation and its hindering effects on achieving justice); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. 
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 769-
70 (20 10) (reporting that a survey of federal cases in 2008 showed "median litigation costs, 
including attorneys' fees, of $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants" "[i]n cases in 
which one or more types of discovery was reported"). 
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ply unfair pressure on employers who sought to pay their workers lawfully 
but are faced with collective litigation on wage practices that might or might 
not be considered in violation of the FLSA. 114 These arguments point to the 
"gun to the head" settlement pressure that class actions have on employers; 
many commentators have expressed concern over class litigation because of 
this pressure, and many have called for a congressional response, to which 
there has been some success. 115 
These concerns are lessened, but perhaps not wholly alleviated by, the 
216(b) procedural mechanism. As opposed to the unnamed plaintiffs of 
Rule 23 classes, FLSA collective actions are comprised only of workers that 
affirmatively opt in and report wage violations similar to those the named 
plaintiffs allege. Because of this procedural quirk, employers are faced with 
fewer collective plaintiffs and, therefore, lower costs. Also, in contrast to 
the complex burden shifting standards of Title VII or intricacies of anti-trust 
law, 116 the liability standard under the FLSA is relatively straightforward, 
which supports a healthy skepticism of whether employers facing FLSA 
actions are truly unknowing victims of "gotcha" litigations. 117 
114. Glover, supra note 70, at 1196 ("[U]nder the American rule of litigation-
whereby each party bears his own litigation costs-virtually all of the costs in these cases 
will be borne by defendants, who likely have little to request in the way of discovery from 
plaintiffs. As a result, discovery alone can generate significant settlement pressure even if the 
defendants did nothing wrong and are likely to be ultimately exonerated." (footnote omit-
ted)). 
115. The Class Action Fairness Act of2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 
substantially changed the landscape of class action procedure in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d) (2006). Concerned with forum-shopping, unscrupulous class action attorneys, and 
professional plaintiffs, the Act codified a "consumer class action bill of rights" and expanded 
federal diversity jurisdiction for class claims. 119 Stat. at 5. However, even within the CAFA 
debate, Congress recognized the value class actions have for small claims: "Class actions 
were designed to provide a mechanism by which persons, whose injuries are not large 
enough to make pursuing their individual claims in the court system cost efficient, are able to 
bind together with persons suffering the same harm and seek redress for their injuries." S. 
REP. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005). Then-President Bush agreed: 
Class-actions can serve a valuable purpose in our legal system. They allow numer-
ous victims of the same wrongdoing to merge their claims into a single lawsuit. 
When used properly, class-actions make the legal system more efficient and help 
guarantee that injured people receive proper compensation. That is an important 
principle of justice. 
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Signs Class-Action Fairness Act of2005, 
(Feb. 21, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases 
/2005/02/20050218-ll.html. 
116. See, e.g., Peter M. Gilhuly & Ted A. Dillman, Officers' and Directors' Personal 
Liability for Wages: The Impact and Limits ofBoucher v. Shaw, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 56, 
56 (2010) (comparing the stricter liability standards of the Federal Worker Adjustment Re-
training and Notification Act to the more liberal FLSA standards). 
117. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) 
("Judge Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole, called settlements induced by a small 
probability of an immense judgment in a class action 'blackmail settlements."' (quoting 
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III. THE GROWTH OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND CLASS WAIVERS IN 
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXTS 
As the number of wage and hour suits precipitously rose in the last 
decade, a parallel trend of arbitration as the "new litigation"118 gained mo-
mentum. The growing number of arbitration clauses in contracts of all 
sorts-trade, consumer, and most importantly for this Article, employ-
ment-resulted in private arbitration becoming a "parallel judicial sys-
. tem,"119 one that allows employers with superior bargaining power to define 
the parameters of the dispute resolution process. 
For employees, mandates to arbitrate any and all conflicts resulting 
from their employment can be found in a variety of places: an offer letter or 
job application, 120 a slip of paper in the envelope that holds their 
paycheck, 121 the employer's employment handbook, 122 or a severance 
agreement. 123 In whichever form they take, arbitration clauses are estimated 
to cover at least 30 million employees,124 a number that most commentators 
agree is sure to continue rising125 given the broad support they have received 
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973))); Robert R. Nic-
colini, McGuire Woods LLP, Recent Developments in Labor and Employment Law, Seminar 
Before the American Health Lawyers Association (Feb. 23, 2005) ("[N]ew regulations [in 
the Department of Labor] also expand the exceptions from impermissible salary deductions, 
narrow employers' potential liabilities if improper deductions are made to otherwise exempt 
employees, salaries, and allow employers a safe harbor to reduce employers' liability from 
gotcha claims." (discussing 29 C.F.R. § 541.603 (2005))). See generally Dan Downey & Lori 
Massey, Discoverectomy II: The End of "Gotcha" Litigation, 13 REV. LITIG. 183 (1994); 
Dan Downey, Discoverectomy: A Proposal to Eliminate Discovery, II REv. LJTIG. 475 
(1992) (describing a plan to reduce gotcha litigation and streamline discovery). 
118. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
I, 8. 
119. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 439 (2011) 
(citing Stipanowich, supra note 118, at 8). 
120. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991) (requiring 
plaintiff to register as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange as a 
condition of his employment, which contained an arbitration agreement); Lewis v. Labor 
Ready Mid-At!., Inc., No. 3:08-1085, 2009 WL 497692, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2009). 
121. Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2002). 
122. Martin v. Citibank, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D.D.C. 2008). 
123. In re Pac. Gas & Electric Co., No. CV-08-1211 CW, 2008 WL 2004275, at *I 
(N.D. Cal. May 5, 2008). 
124. Martha Halvordson, Employment Arbitration: A Closer Look, 64 J. Mo. B. 174, 
174 (2008). 
125. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity 
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 405, 411 (2007); Kathleen L. 
Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action to Enforce Arbitration in Employment Disputes, in !5 
CAUSES OF ACTION 2o 215, 220 (2000); Horton, supra note 119, at 439 ("Arbitration clauses 
appear in hundreds of millions of consumer and employment contracts."); Bryon Allyn Rice, 
Comment, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses 
and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 Hous. L. REV. 215, 220-22 (2008); John B. Wright 
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from the judiciary, especially the U.S. Supreme Court. As Justice O'Connor 
noted in 1995, in structuring arbitration as a preferred forum for dispute 
resolution, the Supreme Court has been "building ... case by case, an edi-
fice of its own creation. " 126 
The latest stamp of approval came in April 2010, when the Supreme 
Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that corporate boilerplate 
language in AT&T's consumer contract mandating individual dispute reso-
lution (with no opportunity to aggregate claims in class actions, known col-
loquially as the "class waiver") is enforceable and consistent with federal 
public policy. 127 The combined effect of mandatory arbitration and class 
waivers facilitates the silencing of low-wage workers from voicing wage 
theft claims. Shedding light on how arbitration works reveals its impact in 
the employment context. 
A. Judicial Enforcement: The FAA 
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to sup-
port the private resolution of breach of contract disputes between trade mer-
chants. 128 Persuaded by the American Bar Association (ABA) and various 
business groups that hostility to arbitration hindered trade, 129 Congress en-
acted the FAA to counteract the '"jealous notion ... that arbitration agree-
ments were nothing less than a drain on [the courts'] own authority to settle 
et a\., Arbitration Trends and Limitations-Class Action Arbitration, in 3 SUCCESSFUL 
PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL§ 57:53 ("As the Supreme Court has 
expanded the scope of the FAA and fostered pro-arbitration jurisprudence, arbitration clauses 
have become a routine part of standard form contracts, not only for sophisticated commercial 
transactions like the one in Stolt-Nielsen, but also for consumer, franchise and employment 
contracts." (emphasis added)); Contract Administration, in 2 POLICIES AND PRACTICES § 
152:15 (2013) ("Most labor agreements contain provisions for binding arbitration of unre-
solved grievances."). 
126. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,283 (1995) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
127. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747-53 (2011) (interpret-
ing the United States Arbitration Act, known as the Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-
401,43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006))). 
128. Horton, supra note 119, at 444 n.32 ('"[The FAA] is a remedy peculiarly suited 
to the disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact-
quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment, excuses for non-
performance, and the like."' (alteration in original) (quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth 
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265,281 (1926))). 
129. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
16 (2006)); see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-
NATIONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION 84-91 ( 1992) (describing how American Bar 
Association officials and businessmen successfully lobbied for FAA's enactment). 
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disputes. "'130 As a multitude of courts have since recognized, Congress in-
tended to place arbitration agreements on "equal footing with other con-
tracts" and establish a '"strong federal policy favoring arbitration."'131 
Section 2 of the FAA provides, quite simply, that "[a] written provi-
sion in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable."132 The broad policy in favor of arbitration is tempered within the 
language of the FAA itself in § 2, where the "savings clause" allows for any 
party to oppose arbitration on grounds that "exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract."133 
Additionally, § 1 offers an express statutory exception for certain em-
ployment contracts, namely "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class 
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."134 Section 4 of the 
FAA provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or 
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may 
petition any United States district court ... for an order directing that such 
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement."135 If a 
litigant in a court proceeding refuses to arbitrate a dispute within the scope 
of a valid arbitration agreement, a judicial order compelling arbitration is 
mandatory, not discretionary .136 
The long and somewhat tortured path of the FAA from a policy pro-
moting the efficient settlement of conflicts between merchants pursuant to 
industry norms to "an invitation to the business community to create a par-
allel procedural regime"137 is one that is largely outside the scope of this 
Article. 138 However, as it relates to the increased relevance to employment 
relationships and, in particular, low-wage workers, an important starting 
130. Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Raasch v. 
NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 853 (S.D. Ohio 2003)). 
131. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); 
JLM Indus., Inc. v. Sto1t-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Hartford 
Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 
2001)). 
132. 9 U.S. C. § 2 (2006). 
133. !d. 
134. !d.§ 1. 
135. !d. § 4. 
136. !d. 
137. Horton, supra note 119, at 444. 
138. For a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the FAA as it 
relates to the modem judicial interpretation, see Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" 
Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996); Horton, supra note 119; and Judith Resnik, Comment, Fair-
ness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. 
Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011). 
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point is the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp. 139 
In Gilmer, a stockbroker's employer required him to register as a secu-
rities representative with the New York Stock Exchange. 140 That application 
included an arbitration clause to arbitrate any dispute arising out of his em-
ployment.141 After the employee was terminated, he sued under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that he was fired un-
lawfully because of his age. 142 The Supreme Court held that employers 
could require employees to agree, as a condition of employment, to arbitrate 
federal statutory age discrimination cases, with reasoning that spawned later 
case law holding that predispute arbitration clauses covering virtually any 
federal and state statutory claim were also enforceable. 143 The Supreme 
Court stated clearly that "' [b ]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a par-
ty does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. "'144 
The Gilmer decision came as a surprise to some scholars145 and em-
ployee advocates given that a previous Supreme Court precedent seemingly 
squarely on point held that an employee could proceed to court on a statuto-
ry rights claim (Title VII) despite an arbitration agreement between the em-
ployer and the union. 146 Nonetheless, Gilmer ushered in a sea change in the 
doctrine of arbitration enforcement: from that point forward, employment 
contracts were seen as fitting squarely within the arbitration mandate. Yet, 
subsequent Supreme Court precedent in this area, including Green Tree v. 
Randolph, did cite the importance of plaintiffs' ability to vindicate their 
statutory rights: arbitration of statutory rights will only be compelled "'so 
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statuto-
139. 500 u.s. 20 (1991). 
140. /d. at 23. 
141. /d. 
142. /d. at 23-24. 
143. /d. at 34-35; see also David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, 
Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2005). 
144. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
145. See, e.g., Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring 
Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1051, 1053-54 (1996) ("Gilmer himself 
should have felt secure in his argument that the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Gardner-
Denver was well on point."); Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 143, at 1558 (noting 
that it spawned a debate amongst scholars). 
146. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,49 (1974). 
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ry cause of action in the arbitral forum, "'147 even in cases that ultimately 
upheld the arbitration conditions. 
B. Class Waivers: Banning Aggregate Claims 
Following the judicial approval of arbitration mandates in employment 
contracts, employers began more vigorously to import language into those 
clauses from commercial and consumer contracts to prevent parties from 
joining together in class and collective actions. 148 Further, employers began 
challenging class arbitrations in agreements that were silent as to class 
treatment in the hope of forcing arbitration of individual claims without 
aggregate treatment. 149 
1. When Silence in Contracts Is Given Legal Meaning 
When faced with an arbitration clause silent on class treatment, the 
Supreme Court first held that "ambiguity" exists as to the intentions of the 
parties and the arbitrator must decide whether the agreement was intended 
to prohibit class-wide arbitration. 150 The plurality decision in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle left many court watchers confused as to the state 
of the law of class waivers, but did at least confirm that courts foresee arbi-
trators as able to conduct class actions and that the FAA does not preclude 
class-wide relief, 151 rejecting a posture taken by businesses. 152 
In response, the plaintiffs' bar renewed its attack on class arbitration 
waivers as unconscionable under state contract principles. 153 Advocates ar-
gued that the inclusion of class waivers in standard adhesion contracts vio-
lated the common law contract doctrine prohibiting "unconscionable" or 
147. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637 & 
n.l9. 
148. See Jean R. Sternlight, Should an Arbitration Provision Trump the Class Action? 
No: Permitting Companies to Skirt Class Actions Through Mandatory Arbitration Would Be 
Dangerous and Unwise, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at 13. 
149. Nora Lockwood Tooher, Plaintiffi Wrestle with Class Action Arbitration Bans, 
LAW. USA, Nov. 19, 2007, at I, available at 
http://pubcit. typepad.corn/clpblog/files/classarbarticle.pdf (noting that after Bazzle, "' [ e ]very 
big company rewrote their arbitration clauses to ban class actions'" (quoting Paul Bland of 
Public Justice)). 
150. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444,451-54 (2003). 
151. See id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that FAA contained nothing 
to override state court's allowance of class arbitration). 
152. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator? Banks 
Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, Bus. L. TODAY, May-June 1998, at24, 24. 
153. See, e.g., Laughlin v. VMware, Inc., No. 5:11 CV 00530 EJD, 2012 WL 298230, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. I, 2012); Massie v. Ralphs Grocery Co., No. B224196, 2012 WL 
1078562, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2012). 
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unfair agreements because they are so one-sided. 154 A majority of courts 
examining the issue initially rejected this theory, holding that the contractu-
al waiver of the "right" to bring a class action did not impact substantive 
rights and, therefore, was not unfair. 155 However, in 2005, the California 
Supreme Court seemingly turned the tide when it held in Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court that because class waivers eliminate any incentive for plain-
tiffs to prosecute negative value claims, these waivers improperly limit de-
fendants' exposure to damages when they appear in consumer contracts and 
are applied to allegations comprised of many small monetary claims. 156 State 
courts around the country followed suit, many finding that class waivers 
were voidable when the cost of litigation dwarfed an individual plaintiffs 
potential recovery. 157 
The Supreme Court attempted to provide clarity to the class waiver 
doctrine in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Anima/Feeds International Corp. 158 There, 
petitioners were shipping companies sued by charterers for price fixing. 159 
The maritime contract contained an arbitration mandate but was silent as to 
class treatment. The parties stipulated that an arbitration panel would decide 
whether the contract permitted class arbitration. 160 The arbitration panel 
determined that the expert testimony presented did not demonstrate an "in-
ten[t] to preclude class arbitration," and, therefore, concluded that Bazzle 
and policy considerations meant that the clause should be read to permit 
class arbitration. 161 The Supreme Court found that the arbitration panel "im-
posed its own policy choice" rather than "identifying and applying a rule of 
decision derived from the FAA or either maritime or New York law" and, 
therefore, it "exceeded its powers."162 The Court did not shy away from tak-
ing on the issue itself, found the FAA controlling, and held that "a party 
154. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake 
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623,632 (2012). 
155. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 818-19 (lith Cir. 2001) 
(enforcing arbitration agreement so long as statute's substantive goals could be vindicated 
through arbitration); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 
2002) (rejecting argument that agreement was unenforceable because of lack of class relief); 
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2000) (enforcing arbitration 
agreement and characterizing class action relief as procedural right); Arnold v. Goldstar Fin. 
Sys., Inc., No. 01 C 7694,2002 WL 1941546, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2002) ("As a general 
matter, the right to bring a class action in federal court is a procedural right .... "); Saga! v. 
First USA Bank, N.A., 69 F. Supp. 2d 627, 631-32 (D. Del. 1999) (holding that availability 
of other enforcement mechanisms can obviate right to proceed by class action). 
156. 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-09 (Cal. 2005). 
157. See Horton, supra note 119, at 462. 
158. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (20 I 0). 
159. /d. at 1765. 
160. /d. at 1765-66. 
161. !d. at 1766 (alteration in original). 
162. /d. at 1770. 
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may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless 
there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so."163 
Accordingly, the Court held that because the arbitration panel "imposed 
class arbitration" without explicit agreement amongst the parties, it reversed 
the decision of the arbitration panel allowing class arbitration. 164 
The takeaway for advocates in the employment sector was that arbitra-
tors must make specific findings on the intent of the parties, but that class 
arbitration is not precluded when the agreement is silent on class treatment. 
Arbitrators applying Stolt-Nielsen examined the intent of the parties as con-
trolling, witnessed by the agreement language and relationship of the par-
ties, but understood Stolt-Nielsen to mean that the parties are not required to 
state an express agreement in order to authorize class arbitration. For exam-
ple, in Benson v. CSA-Credit Solutions of America, Inc., 165 an FLSA case, an 
arbitrator made three findings that supported class arbitration after examin-
ing the intent of the parties: (1) the arbitration clause contained broad lan-
guage referring to "any dispute or claim relating to or arising out of the em-
ployment relationship;" (2) it specifically excluded disputes pertaining to 
trade secrets and proprietary information, and the doctrine of expressio 
unius est exclusion alterius implied that all other claims, including class 
claims, were included, especially in light of the fact that class waivers in 
employment were "not uncommon" in 2008, when the arbitration agreement 
was drafted; and (3) the respondent filed a motion to compel arbitration in 
civil court only after the claimant filed a collective action, ratifying that 
such class claims were subject to arbitration. 166 
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: Protecting Defendants from 
Collective Action 
One short year later, the Supreme Court revisited the class waiver is-
sue in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 161 In Concepcion, siblings en-
tered into a cell phone contract and received the advertised "free" cell 
phones, but, like 54 million other customers, were later charged sales tax on 
the phone in the amount of $30.22 based on the retail value of the phone. 168 
163. ld. at 1775. 
164. ld. 
165. Case No. 11-160-M-02281-08 (2010) (Meyerson, Arb.), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/unreported!Benson.pdf. 
166. See id. at 6-9; see also Passow v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., Case No. 
II 160 00357 08 (2010) (van Gestel, Arb.), available at 
http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/si.asp?id=5490. 
167. 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1744(2011). 
168. !d. 
1132 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:1103 
They sued in federal court and their lawsuit was consolidated with a class 
action alleging false advertising and fraud. 169 
AT&T then moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration 
clause in its standard service agreement, which included a class action 
waiver. 170 Interestingly, the arbitration clause also lowered the expense of 
arbitration for complainants: (1) AT&T paid all costs for nonfrivolous 
claims; (2) the customer chose whether to arbitrate locally in person, over 
the phone, or by written submission; (3) small claims court was available in 
lieu of arbitration; (4) arbitrators could award individual relief including 
injunctions and were not limited to compensatory damages; and (5) AT&T 
was blocked from an award of attorneys' fees but would have to pay twice 
the complaint's attorneys' fees plus a minimum recovery of $7,500 if the 
arbitrator awarded more than AT&T's last settlement offer. 171 The district 
court followed Discover Bank in finding the class waiver unconscionable 
under California state law and directed class arbitration. 172 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed. 173 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 5-4 decision writ-
ten by Justice Scalia, holding that the California Discover Bank rule was 
preempted by the FAA because it interfered with the federal goal articulated 
in the FAA of promoting arbitration. 174 With regard to Section 2's saving 
clause, the Court held that although the "saving clause preserves generally 
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve 
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's 
objectives."175 In so doing, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Discover Bank 
rule had categorically allowed claimants in any consumer case to demand 
class arbitration, which he found antithetical to the streamlined dispute reso-
lution process that makes arbitration so favored. 176 Specifically, the Concep-
cion Court found that "[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of 
class litigation" because: (1) "the switch from bilateral to class arbitration 
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality;" (2) "it is 
at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with en-
169. /d. 
170. !d. at 1744-45. 
171. /d. at 1744. 
172. !d. at 1745; Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cvll67 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 
5216255, *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. II, 2008) (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 
1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005)). 
173. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745; Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 
855, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the Discover Bank rule was a "'refinement of the un-
conscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California'" and did not discrim-
inate against arbitration in violation of the FAA (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless 
Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007))). 
174. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
175. !d. at 1748. 
176. !d. at 1748-50; see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 154, at 638. 
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suring that third parties' due process rights are satisfied;" and (3) "class 
arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants."177 
Moreover, the majority belittled the dissent's concerns about the via-
bility of small value claims as "toothless and malleable."178 The dissent, 
written by Justice Breyer, in tum, asked the interesting question: where did 
the majority get the idea that a fundamental arbitration attribute is individual 
arbitration?179 
Aside from the questionable applicability of the Court's reasoning to 
FAA preemption of state law contract doctrine regarding the statutory wage 
rights of low-wage workers, much of the Court's reasoning is flawed when 
applied to prohibit aggregation of claims. First, arbitration's perceived in-
formality is illusory for low-wage workers if they are unable to afford the 
significant costs of private arbitration. 180 As articulated in Part IV of this 
Article, arbitration might provide a low-cost alternative if arbitration clauses 
were uniform and regulated to disperse the costs of arbitration. Second, the 
due process rights of absent class members are, well, absent in the case of 
FLSA collective actions where each worker must affirmatively opt in to the 
suit. Under Section 216(b ), each worker is a plaintiff in the case that con-
sents to join the litigation; therefore, due process concerns are negated. 181 
Lastly, the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court is concerned about the risks 
aggregate litigation poses for corporate defendants strikes this author as 
altogether inappropriate. The reality of the workplace is that workers have 
no meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms of these take-it-or-leave-it 
arbitration and class waiver clauses. Instead, the terms of the "agreement" 
are presented to the worker as a fait accompli. For low-wage workers fearful 
of losing their jobs, and faced with a growing wage theft epidemic, the no-
177. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1751-52. 
178. !d. at 1750. 
179. !d. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
180. See generally Michelle Eviston & Richard Bales, Capping the Costs of Consum-
er and Employment Arbitration, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 903 (2011) (advocating an amendment in 
the FAA to require cost caps based on what plaintiffs would incur as a result of litigation as a 
method of preserving fairness); Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in 
the Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101 (2010) (discussing costs 
associated with arbitration as a potential barrier to fairness); Yongdan Li, Applying the Doc-
trine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration Agreements, with Emphasis on Class 
Action/Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITIIER L. REV. 665 (2010) (analyzing the requirement of 
plaintiffs to pay costs in wage disputes as a basis for unconscionability). But see Samuel 
Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration, OISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 
2002-Jan. 2003 at 8, I 0 ("Accordingly, arbitration is not a device that deprives employee and 
consumer claimants of an opportunity to vindicate their rights, and may well be the only 
forum in which they can obtain a hearing. The fact that some costs are involved in arbitrating 
such disputes outside the publicly funded court system is not surprising, and, in fact, may be 
necessary to deter pursuit of frivolous claims."). 
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)(2006). 
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tion that the U.S. Supreme Court is mostly concerned with defendants' right 
to be free from potentially expensive litigation is disappointing. 182 
3. The Post-Concepcion Split 
The Concepcion decision has drawn considerable comment from 
scholars183 and advocates, as well as other courts. 184 While some business 
advocates have argued that Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion stand for the 
proposition that class waivers are per se enforceable, other advocates argue 
that these cases read together stand for a more narrow point: that parties 
cannot be forced to arbitrate in class arbitration unless they agree to do so, 
and a categorical rule that classifies an entire set of cases as unconscionable 
violates the F AA. 185 
182. See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: 
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 59-60 & n.47 (2003) 
(barring class actions can operate as an exculpatory clause; no doubt such is the intent of the 
drafters of class action bans). 
183. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fair-
ness Act and the Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. REV. 457, 
491 (2011) ("Following Concepcion, remedies for consumers with low value claims will no 
longer be available through the judicial system. Thus, consumers and their advocates must 
tum to Congress for assistance with this major concern."); Jean R. Stemlight, Tsunami: 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 
(2012) ("It is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a name meaning "concep-
tion" should come to signify death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs .... [Con-
cepcion] is proving to be a tsunami that is wiping out existing and potential ... employment 
class actions."). 
184. E.g., Green v. SuperShuttle Int'l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2011) ("Con-
cepcion convinces us the state-law-based challenge involved here suffers from the same flaw 
as the state-law-based challenge in Concepcion-it is preempted by the FAA. Consequently, 
Concepcion forecloses Green's claim that the district court erred in concluding the class 
action waivers were enforceable."); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 
856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("[Concepcion] does not apply to representative actions under the 
[Private Attorney General Act], and thus the trial court correctly ruled that the waiver of 
plaintiff's right to pursue a representative action under the PAGA was not enforceable under 
California law."); Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-06456-CJC(PJWx), 2011 
WL 4595249, at *II (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011) ("[T]he purpose of[the Private Attorney Gen-
eral Act] 'contrasts with the private individual right of a consumer to pursue class action 
remedies in court or arbitration, which right, according to [Concepcion] may be waived by 
agreement so as not to frustrate the FAA-a law governing private arbitration. [Concepcion] 
does not provide that a public right, such as that created under the PAGA, can be waived if 
such a waiver is contrary to state law."' (quoting Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861)). 
185. Apalla U. Chopra & David Lowe, Class Action Litigation and Arbitration After 
Wai-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T v. Concepcion, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 175, 189-91 (2011); I JOSEPH M. 
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:14 (8th ed. 2011 ); 3 
W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 17:80 (20 12). 
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The current legal landscape is seemingly split fairly evenly as to how 
this precedent relates to the small value wage theft claims of low-wage 
workers. One set of cases relies upon the federal substantive law of arbitra-
bility and determines whether the plaintiffs are able to prove that they will 
be unable to vindicate their federal statutory rights if precluded from aggre-
gating their claims. 186 Following Concepcion, the Second Circuit in the In re 
American Express Merchants Litigation line of cases held that class waivers 
are unenforceable for claimants who are prosecuting federal statutory rights 
if enforcement of the waiver had the practical effect of prohibiting prosecu-
tion of those rights. 187 The court held that the Supreme Court in Concepcion 
did not address this exact issue: whether a class waiver "is enforceable even 
if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforce-
ment would be to preclude their ability to vindicate their federal statutory 
rights." 188 The Second Circuit's focus on substantive statutory protections 
stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree v. Randolph. The 
latest 2012 decision notes that the Concepcion decision does not mention 
Randolph and the federal arbitrability issue remains viable. 189 
Two other circuits disagree with the substantive statutory analysis and 
hold the opposite. The Third 190 and Eighth 191 Circuits have both held class 
waivers enforceable based on the holding of Concepcion. As the Third Cir-
cuit articulated in a FLSA collective action: "We understand the holding of 
Concepcion to be both broad and clear: a state law that seeks to impose 
class arbitration despite a contractual agreement for individualized arbitra-
tion is inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the FAA, irrespective 
of whether class arbitration is desirable for unrelated reasons."192 
A third recent development layers another interesting analysis to the 
question of class waivers for low-wage workers. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) ruled in January of 2012 that class waivers in arbitra-
tion clauses unlawfully restrict workers' right to engage in concerted action 
for mutual aid or protection pursuant to Section 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA). 193 In In re D.R. Horton, a national homebuilding 
186. See Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294,304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Banus 
v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 7128(LAK), 2010 WL 1643780, at *8-9 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010); Reid v. SuperShutt1e Int'1, Inc., No. 08-CV-4854 (JG)(VVP), 
2010 WL 1049613, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010). 
187. In reAm. Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009); In reAm. 
Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Am. Express Merchs.' 
Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012). 
188. In reAm. Express Merchs. 'Litig., 667 F.3d at 212. 
189. !d. at 216 (citing In reAm. Express Merchs. 'Litig., 634 F.3d at 197). 
190. Quilloin v. Tenet Hea1thSystem Phi1a., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2012). 
191. Green v. SuperShuttle Int'l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766,767-70 (8th Cir. 2011). 
192. Qui/loin, 673 F.3d at 233 (quoting Litman v. Cellco P'ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231 
(3d Cir. 20 II)). 
193. In re D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184,2012 WL 36274, at *I (Jan. 3, 2012). 
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company imposed an arbitration clause on its workers that included a class 
waiver. 194 The NLRB held that such an agreement violates workers' rights, 
whether unionized or not, to engage in collective action, protected under 
Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, when it requires employees covered by the 
Act to sign an agreement that precludes them from bringing collective 
claims. 195 
Commentators agree that this decision could have sweeping implica-
tions for all workers, "from low-wage restaurant workers to well-paid em-
ployees on Wall Street," if allowed to stand. 196 
IV. HOW MANDATORY ARBITRATION WITH CLASS WAIVERS AFFECTS 
LOW-WAGE WORKERS: WHERE DO WE Go FROM HERE? 
Scholars have noted a disturbing trend in recent Supreme Court juris-
prudence: the systematic closing of the courtroom doors, especially for 
small claim litigants. 197 For low-wage workers, the hurdles placed before 
class actions by the Wal-Mart v. Dukes 198 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion199 cases reflect this judicial mindset and, as shown above, severely 
limit workers' ability to have their wage theft claims heard and addressed. 
Of course, employers of low-wage workers could decide that allowing 
the arbitration costs of a multitude of individual claims is not an economi-
cally sound policy, and not altogether feasible, but, thus far, the evidence 
points in the other direction-towards advising corporate clients to take 
advantage of the "free pass" Concepcion provides.200 In the alternative, the 
194. !d. 
195. !d. at *9-1 0. 
196. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Backs Workers on Joint Arbitration Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 20 12), http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/0 1/07/business/nlrb-backs-
workers-on-joint-arbitration-cases.html? _r= I&. There are, however, several specific catego-
ries of workers excluded from the NLRA, including: agricultural workers, public employees 
(including of the federal government), private-sector managers and supervisors, and workers 
whose employers have less than the annual revenue required for the NLRA coverage (usually 
$500,000 but less in some industries). See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
197. See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class 
Actions: Dukes v. Wal-Mart and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2011-54, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1966624##; Resnik, supra note 138. 
198. For an analysis of how the Dukes case impacts class actions, and potentially 
wage and hour cases, see Moss & Ruan, supra note 78. 
199. 131 S.Ct.l740(2011). 
200. See, e.g., Ronald W. Novotny, Drafting Class Arbitration Waivers After AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, DISP. REsoL. J., Nov. 2011-Jan. 2012, at 40, 44 ("Finally, for em-
ployers who have not yet decided to implement a mandatory arbitration program, the Con-
cepcion case provides another significant incentive for doing so."); Jay W. Waks & Carlos L. 
Lopez, Challenging AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2012, at 6, 79 
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Supreme Court could recall the original intent of Congress to allow aggre-
gate litigation for promoting judicial efficiency and self-correct from the 
current course. 
In the meantime, wage theft abuse continues to gain momentum and 
low-wage workers are left without adequate recourse. What options are left 
after Concepcion? Four possible avenues of redress remain: two within the 
current system of enforcement and two new proposals. 
A. Redress Within the Current System of Enforcement 
1. Challenging Class Waivers as Precluding Vindication of Federal 
Statutory Rights 
Although at first blush the Concepcion decision seems to provide un-
qualified support to class waivers in mandatory arbitration contracts, the 
issue presented was narrowly tailored to federal preemption law, and ana-
lyzed a broad, categorical state rule. 201 The decision, therefore, does not 
speak to the issue of federal arbitrability, which requires judicial considera-
tion of imposing mandatory arbitration without class treatment on claimants 
who are precluded from vindicating their statutory rights-in this case, its 
effect on low-wage workers in prosecuting their wage rights. This "substan-
tive rights" federal arbitrability analysis was not before the Court in Con-
cepcion and at least one circuit court post-Concepcion has found that it re-
quires federal courts to declare otherwise operative arbitration clauses unen-
forceable when enforcement would prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their 
statutory rights. 202 Several courts prior to Concepcion found that when plain-
tiffs are prevented from doing so, the arbitration clause cannot stand or the 
class waiver is severable from the clause and class arbitration is ordered.203 
A recent decision in the Southern District of New York illustrates how 
this applies in the FLSA context. In Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., employees 
who processed mortgage applications brought an overtime FLSA collective 
("[E]mployers may continue to enforce individual arbitration agreements and class action 
waivers with their supervisory and managerial employees."). 
201. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (discussing preemption); id. at 1746, 1750 
(discussing the "Discover Bank rule"). 
202. See In reAm. Express Merchs.' Litig., 667 F.3d 204,214-16 (2d Cir. 2012). 
203. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2006); Hadnot v. 
Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 & n.I4 (5th Cir. 2003); Paladino v. Avnct Computer Techs., 
Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (lith Cir. 1998); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 
2d 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 
398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). For severed clauses precedent, see Chen-Oster, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11; Herrera v. 
Katz Commc'ns, 532 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); and Beletsis v. Credit Suisse 
First Bos., Corp., No. 01 CIV. 6266(RCC), 2002 WL 2031610, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 
2002). 
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action against Citibank, alleging that they were misclassified as exempt 
from overtime.204 Citibank moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitra-
tion clause in the bank's employee handbook, which included a class waiv-
er.205 The court first held that the right to proceed collectively under FLSA's 
§ 216(b) cannot be waived as a matter of law, citing the legislative history 
of the Act, as well as Supreme Court FLSA precedent. 206 
The named plaintiffs in Raniere were not low-wage workers-their 
estimated FLSA overtime (though hotly contested) ranged from roughly 
$30,000 to $150,000 each, not including liquidated damages (which double 
the amount of overtime due). 207 The court concluded that the plaintiffs were 
not precluded from arbitrating their claims individually because of the po-
tential costs involved.208 Nonetheless, the court held the class waiver unen-
forceable because if any potential class member meets the burden of prov-
ing that her costs prevent her from effectively vindicating her rights in arbi-
tration, the clause is unenforceable.209 "Any other reading would lead dis-
trict courts down the rabbit hole of piecemeal litigation, confounding the 
twin advantages of reducing judicial caseload as well as costs to liti-
gants."210 This line of precedent could find traction in the federal courts in 
FLSA actions and until the Supreme Court visits this issue specifically, 
could provide a vehicle by which low-wage workers can continue to have 
their claims aggregated and heard by the courts.211 
Additionally, the NLRA provides another opportunity for low-wage 
workers to argue that they lose another set of important statutory rights: 
their right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection, as 
provided for in § 7. As the NLRB found in D.R. Horton, the right to proceed 
collectively in a wage action is intrinsic to their ability to engage in concert-
ed activity: "Employees who join together to bring employment-related 
claims on a classwide or collective basis in court or before an arbitrator are 
exercising rights protected by § 7 of the NLRA," specifically the right "'to 
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection. "'212 
204. 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
205. Id. at 303-04. 
206. /d.at311-14. 
207. /d. at 315. 
208. /d. at 317. 
209. ld. (citing In reAm. Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
210. ld.; see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 847 F. Supp. 2d 528, 533 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
211. However, even within the Southern District of New York, not all courts have 
agreed with this reasoning. See LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. II Civ. 
2308(BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 124590, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012). 
212. In re D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *2-3 (Jan. 3, 
2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §!57 (2006)). 
What's Left to Remedy Wage Theft? 1139 
Accordingly, although applied in a small number of cases thus far, an-
other avenue for low-wage workers is to argue that class waivers prevent 
them from enforcing their federal substantive statutory rights under the 
FLSA and NLRA and that federal courts should "harmonize" the FAA and 
these important employee protection statutes by applying the "vindication of 
statutory rights analysis of Randolph and related case[s]."213 
2. Renewed Public Enforcement of Wage Rights 
The Obama Administration has publicized its commitment to wage 
and hour enforcement, committing resources for hiring additional DOL 
WHO investigators, 214 testing the waters for a new "regulatory philosophy" 
of requiring employers to audit themselves to ensure they are complying 
with the law,215 and voicing a renewed commitment to investigate the mis-
classification of employees and enforcement of wage and overtime laws.216 
Because the latest report analyzing DOL enforcement measures is from 
2008,217 whether these measures are successful in reversing the tide of three 
decades of languishing wage and hour enforcement is unknown. However, 
with President Obama winning a second term, the DOL has an improved 
chance of receiving continued support. Moreover a bill introduced in Con-
gress to address this problem, the Wage Theft Prevention and Community 
Partnership Act, died in committee. 218 
Some states and municipalities have recognized the "scourge" of wage 
theft219 and responded with their own wage theft prevention laws. Just in the 
last five years, five states (California, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New 
York, and Washington) and two municipalities (San Francisco and Miami-
Dade County) have enacted such legislation, and three states (Texas, Illi-
nois, and Maryland) and one city (Seattle) amended existing laws to shore 
up wage protections.220 Moreover, criminal penalties for wage theft are an-
213. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 154, at 641. 
214. Press Release, supra note 61. 
215. Regulatory Agenda Narrative, supra note 62. 
216. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Statement of Hilda L. Solis, U.S. Sec'y of 
Labor, on Introduction of Legislation Regarding Issue of Misclassification (Apr. 22, 201 0), 
available at http:/ I www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd!WHD20 I 0054l.htm. 
217. U.S. DEP'TLABOR,supra note 50. 
218. Wage Theft Prevention and Community Partnership Act, H.R. 6268, !lith 
Cong. (201 0), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billslllllhr6268. 
219. Toluse Olorunnipa, Lawmakers to Rework the Wage Prevention Program, 
MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/0l/23/2610900/law 
makers-to-rework-wage-theft.html (chastising the Florida Retail Federation's efforts to scut-
tle the recently enacted Wage Theft Prevention Law in Miami-Dade county as un-American). 
220. NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 20, 35, 
45. 
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other regulatory avenue some communities have taken or considered in 
combating abuse. 221 
In order for these ordinances and state laws to be effective, state and 
local communities have to be committed to enforcing these measures lest 
they become symbolic only. One team of scholars proposes that state Attor-
neys General (AGs) begin making use of their ''parens patriae" authority to 
prosecute wage theft cases on a collective basis.222 By representing the in-
terests of plaintiffs in wage and hour cases, state AGs can take on the role of 
"guardians of the public welfare" by collectively litigating against compa-
nies that inflict "broadly dispersed harms. "223 
Another avenue for redress of wage theft is for local labor regulatory 
agencies to set informal hearings designed to address wage claims. One 
example that can be a model for other states is in California, where workers 
may file an administrative claim with the Labor Commissioner, who has the 
authority to conduct an informal hearing (called a "Berman hearing") and 
award lost wages. 224 Importantly, either party can appeal the decision, but 
the employer is required to post a bond equal to the award, employees who 
prevail in the appeal are entitled to attorneys' fees, and the Labor Commis-
sioner is required to represent employees who cannot afford counsel at the 
trial.225 Such measures protect low-wage workers in their attempt to recover 
lost wages but most critically, until recently, the California Supreme Court 
recognized that wage hearings before the Labor Commission are not subject 
to arbitration mandates.226 However, this holding is currently being re-
litigated post-AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 227 
In any event, although there may be future improvement in public en-
forcement, this is dependent on public budgets and election results, and is 
therefore not a reliable or complete solution to the continuing wage theft 
epidemic. 
221. Seattle City Council Makes Wage Theft a Crime, SEA TILE TIMES (Apr. 25, 2011, 
4:53 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/2014874499 _ wages26m.html; Anna Gorman, 
Labor Advocates Push for Law Making Wage Theft a Criminal Offense in L.A., STRAUSS L. 
GROUP, http://www.strausslawgroup.com/News/Wage-Theft-in-Los-Angeles.html (last visit-
ed Jan. 23, 2013). But see Colorado Lawmakers Reject 'Wage Theft' Bill, CBS DENVER (Feb. 
28, 2012, 4:42 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/20 12/02/28/colorado-may-criminalize-
withholding-wages. 
222. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 154, at 660-64. 
223. /d. at 675. 
224. CAL. LAB. CODE§ 98 (West 2012); see also Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 
247 P.3d 130, 133 (Cal.), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011). 
225. Moreno, 247 P.3d at 136-37. 
226. See id. at 137-39. 
227. Moreno, 132 S. Ct. 496 (remanding the case back to the California Supreme 
Court for further consideration in light of Concepcion). 
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B. Changing the Forum to Fit the Need 
1. Making Arbitration Work for Low-Wage Workers 
Based on the limits of the above two avenues for relief, individual ar-
bitration of wage claims might be the only avenue left for many low-wage 
workers. And if this is the case, what is the likelihood that wage theft claims 
can be successfully addressed in this forum? 
Scholars are characteristically divided on the value of litigation versus 
arbitration as a forum for vindicating statutory rights. As Professors Eigen, 
Estreicher, Shewyn, and others have argued, federal court litigation is slow, 
expensive, and not particularly well tailored to the vindication of rights of 
individual workers, while arbitration is a forum that can be molded to fit the 
needs of low-cost claims. 228 
Despite those observations, for low-wage workers, arbitration is not 
any more welcoming than federal litigation, even with the relaxed eviden-
tiary and procedural rules. Putting aside ability to take off time from hourly 
or temporary work with little job security, potential language barriers, and 
other barriers facing low-wage workers, arbitration is a dispute resolution 
process that has more in common with litigation than with informal resolu-
tion of negotiation and mediation: in order to win a claim, a claimant must 
present evidence and meet the legal burden, must convince the fact-finder of 
the facts and applicable law, and has little chance of appealing an incorrect 
verdict. Although cost, effort, and time spent are higher in federal court, it 
can also be high in arbitration because of the unfettered discretion of the 
arbitrator (for example, to order discovery, to entertain motions, to require 
legal briefings, or to hold an arbitration over several nonconsecutive days). 
Accordingly, advocates combating wage theft need to make arbitration 
as accommodating to their claims as possible. First, advocacy for making 
arbitration clauses fair to workers is one starting point. Ironically, the arbi-
tration clause in Concepcion can be a model. If used in the employment 
context, it would provide for: ( 1) the employer to pay all costs for nonfrivo-
lous claims; (2) the claimant to choose whether to arbitrate locally in per-
son, over the phone, or by written submission; (3) small claims court to be 
made available in lieu of arbitration; (4) arbitrators to award individual re-
lief, including injunctions, not limited to compensatory damages; and (5) 
the employer being blocked from an award of attorneys' fees but having to 
pay twice the complainant's attorneys' fees plus a minimum recovery of 
228. See, e.g., David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Manda-
tory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and 
Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999); Sherwyn, 
Estreicher & Heise, supra note 143, at 1559-61. 
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$7,500 if the arbitrator awarded more than the employer's last settlement 
offer.229 
Next, a movement to make arbitration more cost friendly should in-
clude allowing non-lawyer advocacy in the forum. The ability to proceed 
pro se without an advocate even in a relaxed arbitration forum is outside the 
capabilities of many low-wage workers. Yet, attorneys are expensive, and it 
might be possible to present a viable and winnable wage theft claim without 
legal expertise. One can argue that wage claims are straightforward: did you 
work those hours? Were you paid minimum wage or the mandated over-
time? With the burden for accurate time record keeping squarely on the 
employer,230 simple testimony from the complainant might be enough, espe-
cially if the low-wage worker is clearly outside the managerial or adminis-
trative exemptions. 
Non-lawyer advocates, especially those with knowledge of the indus-
try and worker population at issue, can be successful in stepping in to help 
navigate those waters and assist in marshalling the necessary evidence. One 
place to look for such advocates is in the growing number of worker centers 
in urban areas, which already organize and collaborate on important wage 
issues. The National Employment Law Project, Interfaith Worker Justice, 
Make the Road in New York, the Employment Law Center, and the UCLA 
Center for Labor Research and Education in Los Angeles are a few exam-
ples of successful organizations that are already working to provide support 
for low-wage workers. Adding arbitration advocacy on top of their already 
very full plates will take significant fundraising and training, but it could be 
an important priority and tool in the wage theft fight. 
Unions are another potential source for wage theft prevention that 
might be retooled to include arbitration advocacy. Labor scholars have been 
examining for years the struggle unions are locked in to rebrand themselves 
and make them relevant in the twenty-first century.231 Professor and now-
Deputy Secretary of Labor Seth Harris introduced a symposium centered 
entirely on workers' "Next Wave Organizing," referencing a new paradigm 
of labor law that represents the interests of workers in new and important 
ways.232 Legal advocacy-without attorney representation-in the arbitra-
tion forum could be another "next wave" tenet. 
229. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
230. 29 U.S.C. § 2ll(c) (2006). 
231. See generally Fred Feinstein, Renewing and Maintaining Union Vitality: New 
Approaches to Union Growth, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 337 (2005); Charles Heckscher, Or-
ganizations, Movements, and Networks, 50 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 313 (2005); Jim Pope, Next 
Wave Organizing and the Shift to a New Paradigm of Labor Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 
515 (2005). 
232. See generally Seth Harris, Don't Mourn--Reorganize! An Introduction to the 
Next Wave Organizing Symposium Issue, 50 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 303 (2005); Feinstein, 
supra note 231; Heckscher, supra note 231; Pope, supra note 231. 
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One barrier to such innovation is labor's traditional rejection of man-
datory arbitration of employment disputes. When mandatory arbitration 
began its ascendancy, labor leaders refused to participate in arbitration as a 
means of rejecting the compulsory, adhesive nature of the contracts at odds 
with collective bargaining.233 But, as Professor Roberto Corrada recognized, 
unions should not cut off their noses to spite their faces: "[I]t would be a 
shame if [unions'] stance ultimately inhibits transforming employment arbi-
tration for the betterment of workers. After all, there is some potential for 
arbitration to provide better access, and thus more overall justice, for more 
workers, particularly those who are in the lower wage categories. "234 Hope-
fully, today's unions are more open to arbitration as a forum for dispute 
resolution because with the proliferation of forced arbitration clauses comes 
the potential for wage theft recovery. And unions, with members and advo-
cates committed to worker protection, might be a good fit for the forum. 
However, the most significant barrier to non-lawyer advocacy is attor-
ney practice rules. Assuming there are enough resources and capacity to 
train advocates to take on the role in assisting low-wage workers in arbitra-
tion, this restructuring of the arbitral forum would need to include a specific 
set of procedural rules allowing non-lawyer participation and, optimally, 
recognition from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct acknowledging 
this type oflay advocacy.235 
Generally, states regulate the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) for 
their jurisdictions236 through state rules authorized by various sources: court 
rules, statutes, administrative regulations, judicial opinions, and the state's 
constitution.237 UPL rules regulate the delivery of legal services, which are 
defmed in varying degrees of breadth and oversight.238 A universal defini-
tion of legal services is lacking, but there is some baseline agreement that 
legal services consist principally of preparing legal instruments, giving legal 
233. See Roberto L. Corrada, The Arbitral Imperative in Labor and Employment Law, 
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 919,919-23 (1998). 
234. /d. at 940. 
235. SeeMODELRULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 5.5 (2012). 
236. Federal UPL rules are narrowly tailored to restrictions on who may appear be-
fore the federal courts and federal administrative agencies. See Thomas J. Andersen, The 
Federal Practice Exception: Limitations on State Regulation of Federal Practitioners, 23 W. 
ST. U. L. REv. 281 (1996). 
237. See Quintin Johnstone, Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Power of State 
Courts: Difficult Problems and Their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 795, 796-97 
(2003). 
238. For a recent comprehensive list of state definitions, see AM. BAR Ass'N TASK 
FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, APPENDIX A: STATE 
DEFINITIONS OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-
def/model_ def _statutes. pdf. 
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advice, and appearing in a representational capacity before an adjudicatory 
tribunal.239 
Some states broadly interpret UPL standards to more heavily restrict 
the work of lay advocates in legal matters. 240 Justifications for restricting lay 
advocates include: protecting the public against harmful and unscrupulous 
conduct, supplying disciplinary procedures to regulate those engaged in 
legal work, and keeping competition for lawyers to a minimum in exchange 
for their submission to regulation.241 Other states follow a more narrow def-
inition of legal services to allow for more broad-based lay advocacy, which 
is in keeping with the ABA Commission's Nonlawyer Practice endorsement 
of lay advocates in 1995.242 Such an approach recognizes the unmet legal 
needs in communities of limited resources, in conjunction with efforts to 
improve access to justice.243 
A campaign to liberalize UPL rules across jurisdictions could pave the 
way for workers to vindicate their wage rights in the arbitration forum. Be-
cause such rules are mostly governed by state laws, a model rule and updat-
ed strategy headed by the ABA or other interest group could be the best 
solution for mobilization.244 
2. Wage Claims Court 
A more novel potential avenue to address wage theft is through a judi-
cial process specifically tailored to small wage and hour claims. Small 
claims courts are nothing new: the first one was created in 1912 and almost 
every state has created at least one type of small claims court since.245 While 
structurally different, all small claims courts are focused on resolving dis-
putes with modest dollar amounts quickly and efficiently. Part of their value 
239. See id. 
240. See Soha F. Turfier, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law: If Not Now, 
When? An Alternative Approach to Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1903, 1910 (2004). 
241. See id. at 1916 n.46 (citing Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 2581,2581 (1999) (discussing the legal monopoly)). 
242. See Suzanne J. Schmitz, What's the Harm?: Rethinking the Role of Domestic 
Violence Advocates and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, I 0 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
295, 305 (2004) (recognizing the ABA's role in advocating for more lay advocates in the 
domestic violence courts). 
243. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches 
to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701, 712 (1996); AM. BAR ASS'N 
COMM'N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A 
REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 45 (1995); Kendra Emi Nitta, An Ethical Evaluation of 
Mandatory Pro Bono, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 909, 913 (1996). 
244. See Johnstone, supra note 237, at 842-43. 
245. Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People's Court Examined: A Legal and Em-
pirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 315, 317 (2003). 
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is in taking a '"holistic approach[] to problem solving and dispute resolu-
tion,"' and "'allow[ing] maximum access to the courts by individuals unable 
to afford an attorney' by simplifying [the] rules of evidence and civil proce-
dure."246 Many small claims courts have extremely low dollar limits, such as 
$1,000.247 
Judicial reform activists have called for a reform of the small court 
system to address some of its shortcomings, including: (1) "[ r ]aising small 
claims dollar limits to $20,000;" (2) "[a]uthorizing small claims judges to 
issue court orders," including injunctive relief, not just monetary damages; 
(3) "[e]xpanding small claims dispute resolution programs," such as media-
tion; (4) "protecting non-lawyer litigants;" and (5) "creating user-friendly 
courts," such as by expanding hours, adding advising programs, and in-
creasing staff resources.248 Such initiatives would go a long way in making 
this forum a viable option for low-wage workers. 
As currently structured, do low-wage workers' wage claims fit within 
most small claims courts across the country? Yes, if jurisdictional limits 
were increased specifically to reflect potential recovery of wage claims. But 
the difficulties inherent in navigating the differences in each jurisdiction of 
each court, including in jurisdictions with inadequate wage and hour state 
law protections, might mean that the current structure is a poor fit for the 
task. Another option might be a federal small court system, which some 
commentators have been calling for in order to gain relief from the expense 
and time associated with typical federallitigation.249 
If dreaming of a federal small court system, one might as well dream 
big and consider the opportunity for a small court system tailored to wage 
claims. As a starting point, consider the family court movement. Recogniz-
ing a need for specialized courts to deal with the myriad issues facing fami-
lies, in 1959, three working groups collaborated to produce the Standard 
Family Court Act, designed to assist states interested in creating family 
courts. 25° Family courts grew out of the need to address the disproportionate 
effects of socioeconomic status and race in family law adjudication: 
246. Anthony Ciolli, Lowering the Stakes: Toward a Model of Effective Copyright 
Dispute Resolution, II 0 W.VA. L. REV. 999, I 023 (2008) (quoting Zucker & Her, supra note 
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LITIGATION, Fall2000, at 27, 27). 
247. !d. (citing Zucker & Her, supra note 245, at 318). 
248. James C. Turner & Joyce A. McGee, Small Claims Reform: A Means of Expand-
ing Access to the American Civil Justice System, 5 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 177, 177 (2000). 
249. See Ciolli, supra note 246, at 1023 (identifying federal copyright small claims 
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Court?, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 549,566 (2009) (advocating for the creation of a patent 
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'"[C]ases involving families from the higher social strata rarely come to 
trial because the family has financial resources. "'251 
Then, still recognizing the unmet needs of families, the ABA stepped 
in and recommended the establishment of unified family courts in all juris-
dictions. "Through a two-year project funded in late 1996 entitled 'Commu-
nities, Families, and the Justice System,"' the ABA helped establish unified 
family courts system in six cities.252 The bar recognized that having easier 
access to judicial relief, a judiciary trained and attuned to the specialized 
population's needs, and lower costs are essential in addressing that need. 
A wage and hour court system-recognizing the unmet needs of 
America's poor working families-might be exactly what is required to 
address our wage theft epidemic. Given the parallel need for low-wage 
workers to vindicate their claims in court, a movement-a workers' wage 
rights movement-to address wage theft's pressing legal claims might find 
momentum if spearheaded by a collaboration of worker organizations, un-
ions, practitioners, and scholars. 
CONCLUSION 
For low-wage workers who suffer wage theft, the dollars missing from 
their paychecks violate existing law and significantly impact the well-being 
of individuals, families, and communities. While this dire societal problem 
continues unabated, the Supreme Court continues "closing the courtroom 
doors" by allowing employers to force workers both out of court and into 
private arbitration, while simultaneously prohibiting aggregate claims. Such 
tactics work in confluence to silence wage claims, leaving far too many 
claims unheard while unscrupulous employers gain direct advantage. 
This Article explains how the intersection of various procedural rul-
ings has combined to prevent meaningful redress for wage theft and also 
proposes potential improvements. The courts might take corrective action 
by recognizing that the substantive statutory rights at issue trump arbitration 
and class waiver clauses in worker contracts. Perhaps the current promise of 
increased government enforcement of wage rights will come to pass. More 
ambitiously, unions and other worker activists could transform the arbitral 
forum by becoming legal advocates for low-wage workers to successfully 
prosecute individual wage claims in fair arbitration. Or, we might try a more 
251. /d. at 472 n.4 (quoting JOHN HUBNER & JILL WOLFSON, SOMEBODY ELSE'S 
CHILDREN: THE COURTS, THE KIDS, AND THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE AMERICA'S TROUBLED 
FAMILIES 141 (1996)); Monrad G. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor 
Man, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 694, 70 I (1966) ("Because juvenile courts and family courts serve 
large numbers of the poor, the poor experience, in full force, the troubles raised by the prob-
lems of those courts."). 
252. Babb, supra note 250, at 474. 
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innovative approach to grant meaningful judicial access through creating a 
forum designed to address modest wage claims. 
While mapping the procedural and substantive interconnections con-
tributing to the wage theft epidemic will not alone suffice, it serves to reveal 
the role of law in confounding the delivery of justice to low-wage workers. 
Whether the claims are common law or statutory, at the state or federal lev-
el, in litigation or arbitration, those who toil at the bottom of the economic 
ladder deserve legal remedies for chronic and systemic violations of their 
right to be paid the wages they have worked so hard to earn. 

